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ABSTRACT
All government services require funding through taxes, but not all taxes have the same
effect on the economy. Even when the amount raised is equal, taxes may have very different
distortionary impacts on economic decisions. This thesis estimates this cost in the context
of a dynamic general equilibrium model, which is fitted to a panel data set covering the 48
contiguous United States over the period 1977 to 2004. Taxes on wealth (property), income,
consumption (sales), and capital gains are all compared in terms of their impacts on labor
productivity, gross state product, and household welfare.
Elasticities are estimated for labor productivity, gross state product, and household welfare.
The theoretical model is calibrated using estimates for model parameters found in the state
growth literature. Tax rates are not found to be on the wrong side of the Laffer curve, but
state tax policies are estimated to rely too heavily on property tax revenues and too little on
income and consumption taxes.
The empirical model regresses state labor productivity, defined as output per worker, on
state tax policy, six control groups, fixed state effects, and between year effects. The average
state is estimated to lose 9.49% of its labor productivity annually because of its tax policy.
Taxes on property are estimated to have the most disruptive effect on the economy, while taxes
on consumption are found to have little effect if any.
State tax policies are ranked according to their support for economic productivity using
historical tax rates and estimates from the empirical model. Nevada, Tennessee, and Wash-
ington are found to have the least costly tax policies while Nebraska, Iowa, and Vermont are
found to have the most costly. A state’s tax policy is found to account for 10% of the variation
in productivity from state to state.
1CHAPTER 1. What Is the Cost of Government?
All public services must be purchased using tax receipts. Each tax, however, comes at a
cost to the economy in the form of market distortions that create dead weight losses, loss of
business from tax competition, black markets, and additional administration. These costs are
largely ignored by policy makers in part because the magnitudes are not known. Without
knowing the cost of levying additional taxes, policy makers can only guess whether the benefit
of a proposed service is worth its price to the economy. Knowing the cost of government is
therefore essential to making good tax policy.
Market distortions occur when prices do not accurately reflect the true cost of a good or
service. A price that is too low will lead consumers to buy more than the socially optimal
amount of the product. This happens any time a government subsidizes a good that has no
positive externality not already captured by the natural market price. A price that is too high
will lead consumers to buy less of that product than would be optimal. This happens any
time a government taxes a good that has no negative externality not already captured by the
natural market price. The result in both cases is that the society as a whole is less well off
than it would be if the prices of all goods and services reflected their true cost of production
distribution, and consumption.
The effects of tax competition contribute to the cost of government at the county, state, and
national level. Holcombe (2004) compared income growth rates in counties on state borders
with neighboring counties in other states. He estimated that when states raise their income
tax rates more than their neighbors they suffer from slower income growth, and an average
reduction of 3.4% in per capita income. Multinational corporations are affected by the same
incentives that lead households and firms to live and work in states with lower income tax rates.
2The United States federal corporate tax rate is second only to Japan in the world. Some states,
including California, Iowa, and New Jersey have state levied corporate tax rates high enough
to exceed Japan! The result of high taxes on an economy, although not universally recognized
by economists, is that counties, states, and countries with high tax rates lose business from
firms who can choose their location.1
Black Markets make up another set of costs that taxes impose on the economy. If given the
choice, people will not pay taxes. Economic theory suggests that most people agree to paying
taxes only because they believe others in the society will pay taxes as well. Black Markets
give people the choice to avoid taxes, but not without the risk of getting caught. Increasing
a tax rate lowers the threshold required by a firm or consumer in the economy to participate
in a black market. When this happens the burden of paying for public services is placed more
heavily on those who pay their taxes. Goods that are potentially harmful to consumers, such
as meats and drugs, require inspection by the Food and Drug Administration. Services such as
tree felling require licensing in most counties to ensure that the managers are properly trained.
When these goods and services are traded and performed on a black market, there is a greater
risk to consumer health along with a loss in tax receipts.2
The act of collecting taxes is a cost in itself. It costs money to process tax returns. It costs
more money to pay politicians to debate how taxes will be spent. It takes time and money
for households and firms to prepare tax forms. Costs on the government side are referred to
as administrative costs whereas costs on household’s and firm’s are referred to as compliance
costs. Both add significantly to the cost of government.3
1Devereux (2008) looks at the effects of tax competition at the international level. Feld (2003) gives another
view of the cost of tax competition at the local level.
2Erard (2001) identifies who is most likely to illegally avoid paying their taxes and estimates how much the
federal budget suffers as a consequence of illegal tax evasion. Nordblom (2006) studies how families avoid paying
taxes on transfer payments.
3Godwin (2003) “reviews the existing body of research into compliance costs, considers the methodological
problems revealed by research, and assesses the significance of compliance costs to public policy.” Olken (2006)
attempts to quantify the administrative costs of levying taxes in the context of Indonesia.
31.1 Approaching the question of optimal tax policy
Tax receipts come at a cost to economic health and social well-being. However, tax receipts
are required in order to pay for public goods necessary for the survival and prosperity of the
state. The quest for an optimal tax policy must therefore address both the costs and the
benefits of each tax levy. This work argues that for a tax policy to be optimal it must first
provide tax receipts in a manner that minimizes cost. A tax levy that produces greater marginal
receipts can still be inferior to another tax levy if the cost of those receipts are greater in terms
of their effect on economic health and social well-being.
The quest for the best tax policy is an old one and its literature is vast. Some scholars
4 take a “golden bullet” approach; seeking to find the one tax levy that is the best or worst.
A well published example of the golden bullet approach is the argument for a zero-tax-on-
capital-income, favoring instead taxes on consumption and wage income. Other scholars5 take
a “best basket” approach; arguing that multiple tax levies should be used and try to find the
optimal weights for each tax levy. Many of the scholars participating in the debate over a
zero-tax-on-capital-income tax policy are cited in this work. Due to its relevance, a summary
of the debate is located in appendix B.
The intuition behind the shape of a Laffer Curve suggest that the best basket approach is
more useful than the golden bullet approach. Tax levies provide no tax receipts at a rate of
0% or 100%, which means that there is a maximum somewhere along side this function. It is
possible that for some range of a tax rate, the marginal gains in tax receipts are increasing,
however, this cannot be true over the entire range because maximum receipts are generated
from some tax rate between 0% and 100%. This fact implies that for any tax levy, their
exists some rate for marginal receipts gained from increasing the tax rate are zero. Other
tax rates rely on a different subset of market transactions. For this reason they are likely to
still generate some positive marginal receipts from an increased rate. The best tax policy can
4Chari (1999), Chamley (1986), Judd (2002). All three papers are discussed in the appendix discussion,
“The zero-tax-on-capital debate”.
5Zodrow (2006), “Should Capital Income Be Subject to Consumption-based Taxation?”
ColemanII (2000), “Welfare and optimum dynamic taxation of consumption and income”.
Helms (1985), “The effect of state and local taxes on economic growth: A time series-cross section approach”.
4therefore be characterized by two necessary conditions. First, the marginal efficiency of all tax
levies available must be equal. If any is greater than the other, the tax policy is costing too
much in terms or economic health and societal well-being per dollar gained in tax receipts.
A second necessary condition is that the marginal gain in tax receipts, when spent on public
goods, produces a benefit equal to the cost. If both conditions are met the tax policy is
optimal. The creation of an optimal tax policy thus requires an understanding of both the
cost and benefit of government.
This work does not attempt to quantify the benefit of government. The cost of government
is much easier to quantify because there are only a few ways that a government can levy a
tax. In contrast, politicians never run out of new ways to spend money. Even so, the process
of developing an optimal tax policy is simple. For an instructive thought experiment, think of
all the ways that a government could spend its tax receipts. Now rank them in terms of their
usefulness to an economy. At one extreme, there are public goods whose benefits easily justify
the cost of levying additional taxes, such as providing national security and property rights.
At the other extreme are those comparatively useless projects, such as building the world’s
largest toaster, which would not be worth the cost of levying additional taxes.6 Somewhere
between these two extremes are all those public goods whose value is currently up for debate,
such as the value of providing single-payer health care and punishing victimless criminals.
Without a ball park estimate of the cost of levying additional taxes, policy decisions are
nothing more than guess work. Estimating the value of public goods like single-payer health
care is hard enough without knowing the threshold needed for the public good to realize a net
benefit to society.
1.2 Measuring economic health and social well-being
The goal of any benevolent government is to increase the well-being of its citizens. This
goal is multi-faceted, complicated, and at times impossible to quantify (or qualify). For this
reason, coming up with a measure for social well-being is both challenging and subjective.
6Unless the state in question has an unusually strong preference for large toast.
5The vast majority of economists believe that economic health plays a vital role in determining
social well-being. However, there is a debate over whether economic health is synonymous
with social well-being. This debate is discussed in the next subsection.
Governments use a number of different indicators for measuring both economic health
and social well-being. These three measures all attempt to quantify an economy’s economic
health; gross domestic product (GDP), productivity (output per unit of labor), and green
GDP7. Measures of social well-being include public welfare, the Human Development Index,
the Genuine Progress Indicator, and Gross National Happiness to name just a few.
This analysis focuses primarily on productivity as a measure for both economic health
and well-being, however, the theoretical model constructed in chapter 2 also includes two
additional measures including GDP and household welfare.8 Productivity is defined in this
work as GDP per working person.9 The key benefit of productivity is that it is tied to wages.
The productivity of a state can be interpreted as the average value of goods and services
produced per working person. Productivity is the measure of economic health most often
used in the United States.10 Productivity normalizes gross domestic product by the working
population, allowing a better comparison between states of different sizes.
The debate over GDP
Productivity is equal to GDP per working person. Although generally excepted as the best
measure of an economy, GDP is not without its imperfections. GDP’s role as the primary
indicator of economic health has come under heavier scrutiny this year, particularly by the
7Green GDP is calculated by adjusting GDP for permanent changes in natural resources and environmental
health.
8Defined using a Cobb-Douglas utility function where the household’s utility is increased from consumption
and leisure.
9The Census Bureau defines productivity as gross domestic product per hour worked. This analysis focuses
on the contiguous United States. Only since the year 2000 has the Census Bureau started collecting data on
state level hours worked so this work approximates by substituting number of hours worked with number of
working people.
10The National Bureau for Economic Research (NBER) “does not define a recession in terms of two consecutive
quarters of decline in real GDP.” The NBER, a nonpartisan research organization, defines a recession as “a
significant decline in economic activity spread across the economy, lasting more than a few months, normally
visible in real GDP, real income, employment, industrial production, and wholesale-retail sales.”
This distinction made by the NBER implies that GDP should not be used independently as a measure for
economic health.
6French government. Nobelist Joseph Stiglitz and Professor Anthony de Jasayan offer opposing
views on how well GDP reflects both economic health and social well-being.
Anthony de Jasay, author of “The State” (Oxford, 1985), believes that GDP is a better
indicator because “it has nothing to do with the opinions of the indexer”. Jasayan argues that
GDP “is the objective result of the subjective choices of billions of consumers and producers
who jointly determine world prices...with GDP, it is impossible for a left-leaning statistician
to overweigh welfare provisions or public health-care or a right-wing one to overweight police
services.” The use of GDP as the standard was called into question recently by Nicolas Sarkozy,
the president of France. France has slipped compared to other European countries when viewed
according to GDP, but does well when viewed by alternative indicators such as Gross National
Happiness. It is likely for this reason that President Sarkozy asked Nobelists Amartya Sen
and Joseph Stiglitz earlier this year to head up the creation of an alternative to GDP. Jasay
compares Sarkozy’s actions to that of “shooting the messenger” and argues that changing its
indicator away from GDP won’t fix France’s economy. Justin Fox, a writer for Time Magazine,
agrees with Jasay pointing out that, “Over the years, GNP and GDP have proved spectacularly
useful in tracking economic change, both short-term fluctuations and long-run growth. Which
isn’t to say GDP doesn’t miss some things.”
Joseph Stiglitz, an advocate of alternative measures of social well-being, recently pointed
out many of the things that GDP misses in a speech he made to the Asia Society in New York
on February 5, 2008. He argues that because “accounting frameworks do effect behavior”, any
aspect of well-being ignored by GDP will also be ignored by policy makers. To illustrate he
gives four areas where GDP fails to measure social well-being properly. “GDP doesn’t tell you
anything about what happens to the typical citizen.” If income inequality is rising then the
average citizen could have a lower standard of living while GDP increases. “GDP also tells
you nothing about stability.” As an example, Stiglitz points out that a significant portion of
China’s recent economic growth came at a significant cost to the environment and required a
permanent depletion of China’s natural resources. Some areas of well-being ignored by GDP
make living in the United States look better on paper than in reality. “The United States
7has about ten times as many people per capita in prison than other advanced industrialized
countries. That contributes to GDP because we have to spend more money incarcerating
them... We spend more on health care than any other country as a percent of GDP, and our
health outcomes are much lower than in other advanced industrialized countries...the extra
money we spend on health care shows up as a contribution to GDP. If we got more efficient
(at providing health care) our GDP could go down.”
Stiglitz also argues that GDP may not be as objective a measure of well-being as thought
by economists like Anthony de Jasay. Stiglitz points out that the switch from gross national
product (GNP) to GDP had a “political context”. The new focus on GDP made the United
States look better then it would have under the old focus, GNP. While GDP measures the
total product of the country, GNP measures the total income of people from a country. The
reason for the switch, Stiglitz says, is that “When you start outsourcing a great deal, you have
economic activity within the country, but the income from that economic activity, more and
more, going to people outside the country.”
Although the shortcomings of GDP are numerous, GDP (and its closely related measure
productivity) is still the most commonly accepted measure of economic health and social well-
being used in the United States. There are many alternatives to GDP, but no particular
alternative seems to be far superior to the rest. Choosing an alternative from the many in
existence would require a separate thesis altogether. Any interpretation of this work’s results
should, however, be made knowing both the strengths and weaknesses of using productivity
as a proxy for economic health and assuming that economic health is analogous to social
well-being.
1.3 Contributions of this work
The theoretical model’s contribution
This work combines a theoretical and empirical model in order to quantify the cost of gov-
ernment. The theoretical model is a dynamic general equilibrium model designed exclusively
to compare the distortionary effects of four tax levies. Tax competition, black markets, and
8administrative costs are not considered. Simulations of the model provide an in-depth picture
of how each tax levy is unique in its effects on the equilibrium wage rate, consumption, labor
market participation, and capital accumulation. These macroeconomic variables are combined
into three measures for economic health and social well-being including productivity, gross
domestic product (GDP), and household welfare. Each of these measures provides a different
metric for measuring the cost of taxes. Taxes on wage income, property, consumption, and
capital income are generally found to have negative effects on all measures, but their marginal
effects differ. Taxes on capital are estimated to be more disruptive then taxes on wage income
or consumption.
The policy recommendation in chapter 9 constructs an optimal tax policy in the context
of this dynamic general equilibrium model. The method places an emphasis on comparing tax
levies based on their efficiency, defined as the marginal gain in tax revenues divided by the
marginal loss in some welfare measure. The idea behind tax efficiency is that a tax’s ability
to generate revenue is not the only criterion needed to assess the value of a tax. Marginal
Laffer curves are constructed for each of the four tax levies to test whether aggregated state
and national tax rates are on the “wrong side” of the Laffer curve.11
The empirical model’s contribution
The empirical side tests the theoretical model’s estimates of the magnitude of each tax
effect on productivity. Four tax levies are considered in the empirical model including taxes
on property, capital gains, income (both wage income and capital gains), and consumption.
Most of the studies mentioned in the literature review study only one or two groups of tax
levies at a time,12 or they study taxes as a group but ignore individual effects13. Including four
tax levies allows an easier comparison with the real world which includes many more options
for funding public goods.
This work is similar to Bartik (1992) who also looks at how taxes effect state economic
11Tax rates can be so high that decreasing the rate actually increases revenue.
12Chari (1999), Chamley (1986), Zodrow (2005), Jones (1997).
13Bauer (2006), for example, looks at the tax effect as a whole only.
9health using computable model simulations and an empirical analysis. Combining both ap-
proaches into the same work can give a more complete picture than previous studies14 which
rely solely on the strengths of one approach.
14Bartik (1992), Bauer (2006), Bauer (2005), Chamley (1986), Chari (1999), Jones (1997), Modifi (1990),
Phillips (1995), Zodrow (2005)
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CHAPTER 2. A Dynamic General Equilibrium Model with Solutions
The purpose of this model is to quantify and compare the market distortions caused by taxes
on wage income, wealth, consumption and capital income. The model economy takes the form
of a single state containing a representative household and firm. A dynamic general equilibrium
framework is used to solve for five endogenous variables including the wage rate, consumption,
labor, rental rate, and savings. Taxes are imposed exogenously. There is no government in
this model actively choosing an optimal tax policy. Instead, different tax policies are simulated
and compared based on their marginal impact on productivity, gross domestic product (GDP),
household welfare and tax efficiency.
2.1 The representative household
The state has one rational and infinitely lived household meant to represent all the house-
holds in the state. The household chooses consumption, c, work level, l, and savings, k, in
every period , t, so as to maximize its utility function.
Ψ =
∞∑
t=0
βt (ct)
α (1− lt)
(1−α) +
∞∑
t=0
βtλt

 (1− τw)wtlt + (1− τk)rtkt +Gt
−ct − kt+1 + (1− δ − τp)kt

 (2.1)
Household utility is a function of consumption and leisure with a discount on future utility
captured by β. The household is assumed to prefer consumption in the present by restricting
β to values between zero and one. The Cobb-Douglas form assumes constant returns in utility
from consumption and leisure. The household’s time is normalized to one, lt + Lt = 1, where
Lt = (1− lt) = leisure. There is no uncertainty in future wages or savings.
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All earnings must be consumed or rented to the firm for a return of r. The household’s
uses of cash cannot exceed its earnings in any one period as depicted in the households budget
constraint.
ct − kt+1 + (1− δ − τp)kt ≤ wtlt + (1− τk)rtkt +Gt (2.2)
Uses of cash include consumption, ct, and savings, kt+1 − (1 − δ)kt, where savings are
equivalent to the economy’s capital stock and the household’s total wealth. Household savings
equal the difference between next period’s capital stock, kt+1, and this period’s capital stock
net of depreciation, (1 − δ)kt. Earnings before taxes are imposed include wage income, wtlt,
and interest received from savings lent to the firm, rkt.
Consumption, c, and savings, k, are restricted to the set of all positive real numbers. The
depreciation rate, δ, is bounded between zero and one.
2.2 The representative firm
The state has one representative firm that acts as if in a perfectly competitive market. The
result is that the firm always makes zero profits. The firm hires the household to work l hours
of labor and borrows all the household’s capital stock (wealth), k, in order to produce good, Y ,
using a Cobb-Douglas production function. The firm can only get capital from the household.
Profits for the firm equal its revenues minus its costs as represented by the firm’s problem.
max
{kt,lt}
pit = (1− τs)A (kt)
θ (lt)
1−θ − wtlt − rtkt (2.3)
The parameter A is an exogenous parameter representing all inputs into production besides
capital and labor. The parameter θ is bounded between zero and one, imposing some level of
diminishing marginal product for each input.
The household and firm problems make up the entire economy. Endogenous variables w,
c, l, r, and k can be solved for as a function of exogenous parameters α, θ, β, A, and δ. The
economy has an incomplete capital market with two goods, labor and capital.
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Four taxes are levied in the economy. Taxes on wealth, τp, are levied on the households
property (capital stock). Taxes on capital income, τk, are levied on the household’s return on
savings. Taxes on consumption, τs, are levied on the firm’s sale of goods to the household.
Taxes on wage income, τw, are levied on the household. All tax revenues are given back to the
household each period t in the form of a lump sum rebate G.
Gt = (τw)wtlt + τsA (kt)
θ (lt)
1−θ + τpkt + τkrtkt (2.4)
The good produced by the firm is sold back to households at a price of one. Equations
2.1, 2.3, and 2.4 are the theoretical model in its entirety. The crucial element of the model
is how the exogenously set taxes on wage income, wealth, consumption and capital income
affect endogenous variables, measures of economic health, measures of social well-being, and
tax efficiency.
2.3 Solving the model
Household first order conditions in steady state
The first order conditions (FOCs) of the household’s problem with respect to ct, lt, kt and
Lagrangian multiplier λt are given in equations 2.5 through 2.8.
λ = α (c)α−1 (1− l)(1−α) (2.5)
Equation 2.5 requires that the marginal benefit from consumption equal the price of the con-
sumable good. λt is the shadow price of consumption.
(1− α) (c)α (1− l)(−α) = (1− τw)wλ (2.6)
Equation 2.6 requires that the marginal benefit from leisure equals the opportunity cost of
leisure.
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r =
β−1 − 1 + δ + τp
1− τk
(2.7)
Equation 2.7 is the Euler equation which immediately solves for r, the equilibrium rate of
return on capital rented by the firm from the household.
c = wl + τsA (k)
θ (l)1−θ + (−δ + r)k (2.8)
Equation 2.8 restates the households budget constraint. 1
Firm first order conditions in steady state
The FOCs of the firm’s problem with respect to k and l are given in equations 2.9 and 2.10.
r = θ(1− τs)A (k)
θ−1 (l)1−θ (2.9)
Equation 2.9 requires the marginal revenue from renting capital from the household to
equal the rental rate of capital.
w = (1− θ) (1− τs)A
(
k
l
)θ
(2.10)
Equation 2.10 requires the marginal revenue from hiring additional labor is equal the wage
rate. Note that the wage rate, q over l, is proportional to labor productivity.
Rental rate of capital
The rental rate of capital is given in 2.7.
Household’s wage rate
The household’s wage rate, w, is solved by substituting a ratio of 2.9 and 2.10, into 2.10.
1In the steady state kt+1 equals k.
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w = (1− θ) (1− τs)A
(
k
l
)θ
w = (1− θ) (1− τs)A
(
wθ
r(1− θ)
)θ
Substitute in 2.7 to get productivity as a function of tax levies.
w = (1− θ) (1− τs)A

 wθ(
β−1−1+δ+τp
1−τk
)
(1− θ)


θ
w = (1− θ) ((1− τs)A)
1
1−θ
(
θ (1− τk)
(β−1 − 1 + δ + τp)
) θ
1−θ
(2.11)
Shadow price of consumption
The endogenous variable λ is the shadow price of consumption. To solve for, λ, start by
setting 2.5 equal to
(
c
1−l
)α−1
.
α (c)α−1 (1− l)(1−α) = λ(
c
1− l
)α−1
=
λ
α
Then set 2.6 equal to c1−l .
(1− α) (c)α (1− l)(−α) = (1− τw)wλ(
c
1− l
)α
=
(1− τw)wλ
(1− α)(
c
1− l
)
=
(
(1− τw)wλ
(1− α)
)(1/α)
Then substitute c1−l from 2.6 into 2.5.
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(
c
1− l
)α−1
=
λ
α
((1− τw)wλ
(1− α)
) 1
α


α−1
=
λ
α
λ
α−1
α
(
(1− τw)w
(1− α)
)α−1
α
=
λ
α
λ
1
α = α
(
(1− τw)w
(1− α)
)α−1
α
λ =

α((1− τw)w
(1− α)
)α−1
α


α
= αα
(
(1− τw)w
(1− α)
)α−1
(2.12)
Labor
Households choose labor supply based on the condition that the marginal rate of substitu-
tion between leisure and consumption should equal the consumer’s net wage rate. This equality
is constructed by taking the ratio of 2.6 and 2.5.
α (c)α−1 (1− l)(1−α)
(1− α) (c)α (1− l)(−α)
=
λ
(1− τw)wλ
(1− τw)w =
(1− α) c
α (1− l)
α (1− l) (1− τw)w
(1− α)
= c
To solve for labor, l, set 2.9 equal to capital.
θ(1− τs)A (k)
θ−1 (l)1−θ = r
θ(1− τs)A(
k
l
)θ−1 = r
(
r
θ(1− τs)A
) 1
θ−1
=
k
l
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l
(
r
θ(1− τs)A
) 1
θ−1
= k
From the household’s budget constraint 2.8, substitute c from the ratio of 2.6 and 2.5.
c = wl + τsA (k)
θ (l)1−θ + (−δ + r)k
α (1− l) (1− τw)w
(1− α)
= wl + τsA (k)
θ (l)1−θ + (−δ + r)k
Then substitute this ratio in for every k in 2.9.
α (1− l) (1− τw)w
(1− α)
= wl + τsA (k)
θ (l)1−θ + (−δ + r)k
α (1− l) (1− τw)w
(1− α)
= wl + τsAl
θ
(
r
θ(1− τs)A
) θ
θ−1
(l)1−θ + (−δ + r)l
(
r
θ(1− τs)A
) 1
θ−1
α (1− l) (1− τw)w =


(1− α)wl + (1− α) τsA
(
r
θ(1−τs)A
) θ
θ−1 (l)+
(1− α) (−δ + r)l
(
r
θ(1−τs)A
) 1
θ−1


(1− l) =


(1− α)w + (1− α) τsA
(
r
θ(1−τs)A
) θ
θ−1 +
(1− α) (−δ + r)
(
r
θ(1−τs)A
) 1
θ−1 l


α (1− τw)w
1
l
=


(1− α)w + (1− α) τsA
(
r
θ(1−τs)A
) θ
θ−1 +
(1− α) (−δ + r)
(
r
θ(1−τs)A
) 1
θ−1


α (1− τw)w
+ 1
Substitute in the rental rate of capital and the wage rate to get the closed form solution
for labor
l =
α (1− τw)w
 (1− α) (1 + τw)w + (1− α) τsA
(
r
ϕθ(1−τs)A
) θ
θ−1 +
(1− α) (−δ + r)
(
r
ϕθ(1−τs)A
) 1
θ−1 + α (1− τw)w


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Consumption
Start with the ratio of the consumer’s FOCs with respect to consumption and leisure given
in 2.5 and 2.6.
c =
(1− l) (1− τw)αw
(1− α)
Then substitute in the solution for labor, wage rate, and rental rate of capital.2
c = 1−


α (1− τw)w
(
1− τhw
)
αw (1− α)−1{
(1− α)w + (1− α) τsA
(
r
θ(1−τs)A
) θ
θ−1 + (1− α) (−δ + r)
(
r
θ(1−τs)A
) 1
θ−1 + α (1− τw)w
}


(2.13)
Capital
Start with the firm’s FOCs with respect to capital and then substitute in the solution for
labor, wage rate and rental rate of capital.3
k =

 α (1− τw)w
(
r
θ(1−τs)A
) 1
θ−1
(1− α)w + (1− α) τsA
(
r
θ(1−τs)A
) θ
θ−1 + (1− α) (−δ + r)
(
r
θ(1−τs)A
) 1
θ−1 + α (1− τw)w


2Only the solution for labor is substituted here.
3Only the solution for labor is substituted here.
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CHAPTER 3. Calibrating the Model for Simulations
The purpose of the dynamic general equilibrium model just constructed is to give some
insight into how taxes affect economic health and social well-being. To do this, the model’s
parameters are fitted with values reflecting the economic environment of a state in the United
States. The productivity elasticity of each tax levy can be estimated and compared to empirical
model estimates in chapter 8. The next chapter discusses the tax effects on productivity, gross
domestic product, and household welfare summarized in table 4.1.
3.1 Substituting values for model parameters
The productivity elasticity of a tax estimated from the theoretical model depends on the
values given to model parameters representing multi-factor productivity, A, output elasticity
of capital, θ, household elasticity of consumption, α, the household’s discount factor β, and
depreciation rate δ. The bounds given for these parameters in the model’s construction are
not restrictive enough to draw any direct conclusions about which tax levies are less distortive
than others. For this reason, model parameters are given a stricter range of admissible values
meant to better represent the economic reality of the United States from 1977 to 2004.
Multi-factor productivity, A, is measured by the Bureau of Labor statistics (BLS) as a
growth rate. This model includes A, but only as a level. The level of A captures all the
other factors of production besides capital and labor, such as human capital and technology
which affect the representative firm’s production capability. The level of A does not change in
this model and can therefore not be fitted with values estimated by the BLS. For this reason,
multi-factor productivity is given the neutral value of 1. This value is neutral because the
elasticities calculated in the next chapter are not affected by the value of A.
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Output elasticity of capital, θ, for a typical firm in the United States is estimated by Romer
(1994) to be between .3 and .4.1 These values determine how marginal output is affected by
changes in the firm’s inputs, labor and capital. These values imply that if capital is increased
by 1%, output increases between .3% and .4%. Output elasticity of labor is equal to (1− θ).
Therefore output elasticity of labor is estimated to be between .6 and .7.2 If labor increases
by 1%, output increases by .6% to .7%. The value of θ does not change the direction (first
derivative) of the relationship between taxes and the model’s endogenous variables. However,
the concavity/convexity (second derivative) of the relationship between tax rates and model’s
endogenous variables is often sensitive to changes in the value of θ. For example, the second
derivative of the wage rate with respect to the capital income tax, given in equation 3.1, shows
that if θ is less than .5, the sign is negative.
∂”w
∂τk”
=
θ3
(
−1 + θ1−θ
)(
θ(1−τk)
−1+(1/β)+δ+τp
)−1+ θ
1−θ (A ∗ (1− τs))
1
1−θ(
−1 + 1β + δ + τp
)2


< 0 if θ < .5
> 0 if θ > .5
= 0 if θ = .5


(3.1)
If θ is less than .5, an increase in the capital income tax rate decreases the wage rate but at
a decreasing rate. If θ is greater than .5, an increase in the capital income tax rate decreases
the wage rate at an increasing rate. Assuming θ to be greater than .5 will change the sign of
the second derivative of endogenous variables with respect to tax rates in many cases.
Restricting the household elasticity of consumption, α, to any particular value between
zero and one does not affect the sign of the second derivative of endogenous variables with
respect to tax rates. The value of α is assumed to be the neutral value of 0.5, giving equal
preference to consumption and leisure all else equal.
A wide range of values could be used for the household’s discount factor, β, with at least
some empirical support. Frederick (2002) compiles a list of studies estimating β factors with
1Romer (1999), finds .4 to be a good estimate for θ but also finds this number to be “a bit smaller” for
industrialized countries. This work assumes “a bit smaller” to mean .3.
2The cobb-douglas form has constant returns to scale; scaling inputs by X scales outputs by X.
20
estimates ranging from 0 to 1.06. The variation in these estimates can be mostly explained by
the time horizon used in the study, the shortest being only a few days, the longest being 57
years.3 Studies with time horizons longer than a few years estimate β to be between .9 and .97.
This model’s household lives forever making the range of .9 to .97 more suitable than estimates
under shorter time horizons. The parameter β is nothing more than a scalar in the model’s
solution and does not change the signs of any of the first or second derivatives of endogenous
variables with respect to tax rates.
Empirical estimates for the depreciation rate, δ, depend on the type of capital in question.
The household’s capital stock is its wealth which it loans to the firm. The capital good can be
effortlessly transformed from a consumable good into an input for production implying that
the good is not physical and resembles something like cash or corn. However, to reflect the
nature of capital in the United States, the household’s capital stock is assumed to be a physical
capital. Estimates of physical capital depreciation, δ, range from .034 and .126, meaning that
the capital stock looses around 8% of its value every year. This range of estimates is based
on five studies at different points in the time period used in the empirical analysis, 1977 -
2004.4 Changing the value of δ does not change the sign of the first or second derivatives of
endogenous variables with respect to tax rates. Details on how parameter values affect the
endogenous variables of the model are discussed in appendix A.
Estimating historical tax rates
The marginal effect of a tax on productivity is a function of its own rate. For this reason,
a proper comparison between results from the theoretical model and the empirical models
requires that the theoretical model be fitted with the tax parameters equal to average tax
rates for the United States from 1977 to 2004. This requires an estimate for both the federal
and state rates on income, property, consumption, and capital gains.
The Congressional Budget Office estimates the average effective federal income tax rate for
the years 1979 - 2004 to be 10.36%. Department of Treasury has estimates for the capital gains
3All studies normalized beta to a period of one year.
4Nadiri (1993), Musgrave (1992), Bischoff (1987), Kollintzas (1985), and Epstein (1980)
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effective tax rates for the years 1977 - 2004. These federal estimates are added together with
average effective state and local tax rates using tax receipts per percent income for taxes on
income, sales plus excise, and property. The capital gains estimate for effective tax rate uses
the average maximum marginal rate from 1977 to 2004. Using these estimates, the average
effective tax rate imposed at the federal, state and local level for income, wealth, sales plus
excise and capital gains are 12.2%, 3.7%, 3.4% and 23.4% respectively. These taxes rates are
assumed to be roughly analogous to the tax levies in the model.
22
CHAPTER 4. Theoretical Model Results
The purpose of the theoretical model is to estimate the cost of taxes on income, consump-
tion, property, and capital gains. Labor productivity, defined as output per unit of labor, is
the primary metric of interest in estimating the cost of each tax. The productivity elasticity
for a 10% increase in each tax (say 5% to 5.5%) is summarized in table 4.1. Model parameters
A, θ, α, β, and δ are given the “Average”1 values 1, .35, .5, .935, and .08 respectively. Tax
parameters are given values nearly equal to the average effective tax rates faced by a typical
American household, aggregating tax rates at the federal, state, and local level.2
Two additional metrics for quantifying the cost of the four tax levies are included in table
4.1. These metrics are called household welfare and gross domestic product. All three measures
are used repeatedly throughout the literature on tax policy as a means of quantifying economic
health and social well-being. Additional sets of model parameter values are also included in
table 4.1 to test the robustness of results calculated using an average of the parameter values
calculated in chapter 3.
4.1 Productivity, household welfare, and gross domestic product
Productivity
Productivity is average output produced by a state per unit of labor. Productivity is
proportional to the wage rate.
w = (1− θ) ((1− τs)A)
1
1−θ
(
θ (1− τk)
(β−1 − 1 + δ + τp)
) θ
1−θ
1Average because, as noted in chapter 3, these values are calculated by taking the average of multiple
estimates found in the state growth literature for substituting with model parameters.
2There is a slight variation in this aggregation for each tax rate. See chapter 3 for details.
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Productivity equals total output divided by labor.
Y
l
= ((1− τs)A)
1
1−θ
(
θ (1− τk)
β−1 − 1 + δ + τp
) θ
1−θ
Of the four tax levies addressed by the model, all negatively affect labor productivity except
for the wage income tax. This result is not robust to alternative forms of the production
function.
Household welfare
Welfare is the total utility of the household plus firm profits. By assumption, the firm
always makes zero profits. Household Welfare is given by the utility function.
U = βt (ct)
α (1− lt)
(1−α) (4.1)
Gross domestic product
Starting in 1992, United States used gross domestic product (GDP) in its national accounts.
GDP is the total value of all final goods and services produced in the economy. The capital,
k, rented to the firm is not a final service since it is used in the production of Y . The only
final good or service produced in the economy is Y . Therefore, real GDP can be calculated as
the value of the firm’s total output.
GDPreal = A (kt)
θ (lt)
1−θ = Y (4.2)
GDP can also be constructed from the expenditure side.3
GDPreal = c+ δ ∗ k = Y
The United States used Gross National Product (GNP) in its national accounts until 1992.
3In the steady state the total amount of capital, k, does not change from period to period. That is why the
additional capital savings rate equals the depreciation rate.
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While GDP measures the total product of the country, GNP measures the total output of
people from a country. There is only a difference between GDP and GNP when citizens of the
state produce goods or services abroad, or when foreigners produce goods or services in the
state. GDP and GNP are the same in this model because there is only one state.
4.2 Elasticities of welfare measures and tax levies
Three simulations
Using current tax rates, the model estimates the productivity elasticity of taxes on income,
property, consumption, and capital gains. Three different sets of model parameters are used
to gauge the robustness of results. The first simulation is called the “Average” because it
substitutes model parameters A, θ, α, β, and δ with an average of estimates for the parameters
cited in the literature.4 For example, estimates for the depreciation rate for physical capital, δ,
range from .034 to .126. The “Average” model assumes a depreciation rate of (.034 + .126) /2 =
.08. The two other simulations, called the “High” and “Low”, substitute model parameters
with the most extreme estimates found in the literature to gauge the sensitivity of results
from the simulation using “Average” parameter estimates. The low model does not use the
smallest value cited in the literature, but instead uses the value that minimizes the productivity
elasticities of the tax levies. The “Average” simulation substitutes parameters A, θ, α, β, and
δ with values 1, .35, .5, .935, and .08 respectively.
A ranking of which tax is most disruptive is not sensitive to the values given to model
parameters within the range being considered. However, the magnitude of the marginal effects
are sensitive. The highs for all elasticities occur when model parameters A, θ, α, β, and δ
are assumed to be 1, .4, .4, .97, and .034 respectively. The lows for all elasticities occur when
model parameters A, θ, α, β, and δ are assumed to be 1, .3, .6, .9, and .126 respectively.
No other set of model parameters are necessary because the “High” and “Low” set of model
parameters exhaust the range of estimates that can be made from parameter estimates cited
4Average because, as noted in chapter 3, these values are calculated by taking the average of multiple
estimates found in the state growth literature for substituting with model parameters.
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from the literature. For example, all tax effects increase if depreciation rates are assumed to
be lower. Thus, the “Low” set of model parameters uses .034 as the depreciation rate, the
lowest estimate for depreciation cited in the state growth literature.
A ranking of which tax is most disruptive is only marginally sensitive to different metrics
used to measure economic health and social well-being. Taxes on capital gains and property are
always ranked as being more disruptive than taxes on income or consumption. For instance,
the elasticity of gross domestic product with “High” parameter values finds that a 10% increase
in taxes on wealth (say from 5% to 5.5%) will cause gross domestic product to fall by 2.14%.
This estimate is greater than the estimated drop in gross domestic product from the same
increase in taxes on capital gains, a drop of only 1.85%. All measures of economic health and
social well-being find taxes on capital gains to be more costly than taxes on wealth. Differences
in estimates from one metric to the next emphasize the importance of testing one’s definition
of economic health and social well-being.
Metric Productivity GDP Welfare
Parameter Set Low Avg High Low Avg High Low Avg High
Income* -0.20% -0.25% -0.31% -0.18% -0.42% -0.69% -0.22% -0.25% -0.26%
Consumption -0.51% -0.55% -0.59% -0.12% -0.22% -0.33% -0.11% -0.12% -0.13%
Capital Income -1.32% -1.65% -2.04% -1.02% -1.38% -1.85% -0.62% -0.69% -0.73%
Wealth -0.58% -1.06% -2.36% -0.44% -0.89% -2.14% -0.27% -0.44% -0.85%
Table 4.1 Metric elasticities of tax levies: Each tax rate is increased
by 10% in order to calculate the metric’s elasticity, where a 10%
increase in a tax rate of 5% is 5.5%, not 15%. *Income in the
United States is composed of both wage income and short term
capital gains. To adjust for this fact, all tax effects on income are
defined as a weighted average of effects on capital income and
wage income such that income = 84.7% wage income + 15.3%
capital income; The values come from a report by taxfounda-
tion.org for the year 2005.
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CHAPTER 5. Discussion of Theoretical Model Assumptions
This model is designed to give insights into how each tax levy affects productivity by
creating market distortions. In order to focus on this goal many assumptions are made; some
more realistic than others. This section discusses the stronger assumptions used to simplify
the model and how these simplifications may bias the results.
5.1 Exogenous taxes
Chari (1999) and Chamley (1986) both endogenize tax rates by adding a government. The
government chooses tax rates that maximize some function, usually a welfare function. By
endogenizing tax rates they are able to make an argument for which tax policy is the “best”
with the best tax policy being the one that maximizes some welfare function.
The purpose of the theoretical model is to quantify and compare the market distortions
caused by taxes on wage income, wealth, consumption and capital income. To isolate these
distortionary effects, the positive effects of government spending are removed from the model.
In this way, the cost of each tax levy can be compared using a variety of measures for economic
health and social well-being. Any model that utilizes a government agent must give the agent
a clear optimization problem. Only one measure for economic health or social well-being can
be used in such a problem. By not using a government agent, this model can evaluate the
effects of different tax policies using multiple measures for economic health and social well-
being. By incorporating multiple definitions of social well-being, this methods approach adds
an additional robustness check to the results.
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5.2 Firms can not buy capital
Firms are not given the option of buying their own capital. If firms had a choice, the
household would lose its monopoly on capital. This model sets the rental rate of capital
independent of firm demand. Changing the firm’s demand for capital would therefore have no
effect on the rental rate of capital. It would mean that the household could not rent all its
capital to the firm. With no benefits from saving beyond what can be rented, the household
will consume more in the present, decreasing its savings rate.
5.3 Household savings must be invested
Household savings are rented to the firm at an interest rate r. The household is assumed
to have no other options for storing its wealth other than investing. In reality, only a portion
of a household’s savings are invested. By assuming all savings are invested, productivity is
overestimated. This assumption also magnifies the effect of the wealth tax because taxes on
wealth are taken away from firm.
5.4 Taxes are paid back in a lump sum rebate
To isolate the distortionary effects of taxes, the positive effects of government spending are
removed from the model. The benefits of public goods and services could be included in a
number of different ways. Instead of giving back tax receipts in a lump sum rebate, receipts
could also be invested in a public good, ρ, that would enter into the household’s utility function.
∞∑
t=0
βtU i(cit, 1− l
i
t, ρ
i) (5.1)
The addition of a public good would, by construction, require some level of government
investment in the public good in order for the household to receive any utility at all.
Governments could also be allowed to invest in infrastructure, Ω.1 Spending on infrastruc-
1Either alternative treatment of tax receipts could be used in conjunction with the other. A most realistic
treatment would be to split government tax receipts into spending on public works, infrastructure and lump
sum rebates.
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ture could be modeled into the firm production function.
Y (k, l,Ω) (5.2)
Modeling publicly funded infrastructure in this way halts any firm production unless some
tax receipts are invested in infrastructure.2 Mofidi (1990) argues that ignoring the role of
government spending assumes away any rationale for having taxes in the first place. With no
difference between the government giving back all tax receipts and government spending, the
role of government is reduced to an inhibitor of otherwise efficient markets. Chari (1999) and
Chamley (1986) also assume receipts are given back in a lump sum.
5.5 Other assumptions
Market efficiency
In this economy, both the labor and capital markets are efficient. If markets are not efficient
then one could argue that the government has a duty to try to fix it. This is the argument that
president George W. Bush made to the congressional leadership on September 25th, 2008. The
United States federal government passed a bill giving them the power to spend upwards of 700
billion dollars to buy up sub-prime mortgage related assets in order to ease the credit crunch.
Such a strong government role in the financial markets would not be necessary if markets were
naturally efficient.
Market efficiency is a by-product of perfect information and other assumptions. A house-
hold will only insure itself against unforeseen losses if it faces uncertainty and a decreasing
returns to scale utility function. This model’s household faces neither, and the effect is an
underestimation of the savings rate. Lower savings causes lower productivity.
All these alternatives, however, make the mathematics much more complicated.
2Examples of infrastructure might include roads, property rights, and a fair judicial process.
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Income equality
In the real world, investment comes primarily from those households with wealth. One could
argue that having a concentration of wealth in an economy helps investment. This model has
only one household and therefore ignores the issue of income inequality along with other issues
associated with assuming that heterogenous households can be modeled as a representative
agent.
Balanced budget
Households and firms are not allowed to borrow. In the steady state, this simplification
should not be as much of an issue since neither agent will be in perpetual debt.
Homogenous human capital
Using a single representative household assumes that there is only one level of human capi-
tal. The model assumes that only the mean level of human capital is important in determining
productivity. Yu (2008) shows that varying degrees of human capital at the firm level can have
an effect which is not entirely captured by the mean.
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CHAPTER 6. The Empirical Model
6.1 The ideal empirical model
The purpose of this section is to build an empirical model that accurately characterizes all
the relevant factors of a state that influence the value of labor within that state. The value
of labor is of interest because the value of labor largely determines the wage rate received for
the labor. A higher wage rate means a higher quality of life, or at least a more comfortable
one. The ideal model would use a measure for the value of labor that includes the jobs in a
state including those often overlooked but very important jobs around the house like cooking,
cleaning, and raising children. This measure for the value of labor would also discount labor
used in the production of goods that cause pollution or otherwise harm the environment. The
ideal model would then regress this perfect measure for the value of labor on perfect measures
for a state’s tax policy as well as other relevant characteristics of a state that influence the
state’s value of labor. The models constructed in this section attempt to emulate the ideal
model just described, but will, like all empirical models, ultimately be restricted by less than
ideal measures for the value of labor and other state characteristics. Even without perfect
measures the results of the models constructed do give at least some insights into how each
state can create a more efficient tax policy.
The value of a unit of labor is not necessarily easy to quantify. Trouble begins with defining
the word “value”. If the “value” of labor is taken to mean the market value then a measure
called productivity is most useful. Productivity is a common measure of the market value of
labor and is calculated by dividing gross national product (GDP) by the total number of hours
worked in the United States. A state version of productivity divides gross state product (GSP)
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by the working population.1 Productivity, however, is not a perfect measure of the value of
labor. GSP does not include many forms of labor that most certainly have value like cooking
at home. GSP also fails to discount labor used in the production of goods that harm the
environment or use up non-renewable resources. Productivity, even with all its shortcomings,
is used in this study because it is the best measure of the value of labor for which there is data.
A number of characteristics important in determining a state’s value of labor have already
been identified in previous research. These characteristics include education, urbanization,
technology, capital, and many others. Each characteristic represents a concept that in itself is
not always easy to quantify. Take education for example. Without question, a more educated
individual can create more value per unit of labor than an uneducated one, all else equal;
but what is the best way to measure a state’s level of education? The ideal measure would
include all forms of education including experiences on the job and leisure study at home.
Of course, no such measure exists. The measure typically used in the state growth literature
relies on aspects of education that are easily quantifiable such as the the percent of a state’s
population that graduated from high school. This measure ignores any knowledge they picked
up at home or on the job, but probably a good indicator of all other aspects of education
that a more perfect measure would capture. Every empirical modeler must substitute less
than perfect control variables (like the percent of population with high school diplomas) for
less quantifiable concepts (like education). These substitutions are useful because while the
controls may not be perfect, a good one can capture the main idea of what it is trying to
represent.
6.2 Constructing the base model
The purpose of the base model is to come as close to the ideal model at explaining the
factors of a state’s value of labor as possible given current availability of data. The base model
regresses state labor productivity on four tax rates characterizing a state’s tax policy and six
controls. All measures are constructed from panel data of the 48 contiguous United States for
1Data on the total number of hours worked by state have also been made available by the Bureau of Labor
Statistics for the years following 1999.
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the years 1977 through 2004. The lower 48 states serve as a natural experiment in tax policy
research. Each state is allowed to set its own tax policy including taxes on property, income,
sales, excise, and capital gains. The null hypothesis of this experiment is that the value of
labor in a state is not significantly affected by the differences in each state’s tax policy. The
alternative hypothesis is that each state’s tax policy matters. The base model used for testing
this hypothesis takes the following form.
wt+4 = β0 +
4∑
y=1
βy (τy)t +
10∑
n=5
βn (Cn−4)t +
57∑
m=11
βm (Sm−10) +
84∑
j=58
βj (Yj−58)t + t (6.1)
Labor productivity, wit, is a scalar dependent variable for state i at time t. All controls
are lagged by four years with intervening years omitted. Tax levies on property, income, sales,
excise, and capital gains are represented by τ .2 The model’s six control groups represented by
C include: percent of a state’s population with a high school diploma plus the percent with a
four year college degree,3 percent of the population that is in the work force, manufacturing
share of GSP, population density measured as people per square mile, union density measured
as the percent of employees in a state who are members of a union, and an index of real energy
prices. The variable S stands for the 47 binary variables used to control for state fixed effects.
These effects include state characteristics like geography that do not change much over time.
The variable Y represents the set of 27 year dummies used to capture national trends such
as the business cycle, inflation, technology, and federal tax policy. The construction of every
variable is explained in detail in the next chapter.
6.3 Overcoming autocorrelation and endogeneity
Most time series models have to overcome difficulties with autocorrelation and endogeneity.
The base model just constructed is no exception. Autocorrelation refers to the correlation
2These tax rates are equivalent to the tax levies addressed in the theoretical model with one exception. Taxes
on wage income in the theoretical model do not include income from capital gains while income taxes used in
the base model include all capital gains from assets with a duration of less than one year.
3This value can add up to more than 100%.
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between data points from year to year. Business cycles and trends in control variables tend
to be highly correlated from year to year. This poses a technical problem for the regression
model because the error term no longer follows a normal distribution. To reduce the amount
of autocorrelation the base model uses only every fourth year with intermittent years omitted.
This creates a break between years that significantly diminishes the correlation from period to
period. Endogeneity refers to the possibility that policy makers take into account the current
economic environment when making tax policy decisions. It is commonly thought among both
policy makers and economists that tax rates should be lower during times of economic hardship.
Having lower taxes is thought to stimulate growth.4 For this reason, tax rates and controls are
lagged by four years to the previous data point after omitting all but every fourth year in the
base model. The possibility that labor productivity levels are actually causing changes in tax
policy is reduced when the independent variables in the model are lagged.
There is also the question of how long it takes a change in tax policy to impact the economy,
if there is significant impact at all. The answer to this question will depend on the tax levy
in question. Most families don’t have the flexibility to simply move in the year when property
tax rates go up. Likewise, taxes on income may take longer than a year to significantly affect
employee and employer decisions in the labor market. Most employees and employers can’t
easily take up jobs in another state or move their place of business overnight. On the other
hand, taxes on consumption may have some effect immediately. This is especially likely for
businesses near the border of another state with a smaller tax on sales. Chapter 8 includes
alternative specifications of the base model that use lags from 2 to 6 years. These alternative
specifications are used to show how robust the estimated effects of a state’s tax policy are as
well as provide a wider range of estimates.
Control groups are also suspect for endogeneity. The length of time that it takes for any
particular control to affect productivity will depend on the controls in question. Some controls,
like energy prices, may have immediate effects that would be better captured by a shorter lag,
say one or two years. Other controls, perhaps union density, may have effects that take many
4For example, reducing taxes on sales encourages consumption. Reducing taxes on corporate profits encour-
ages investment.
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more years before its complete effect on productivity is actualized.
6.4 Method for choosing controls
Studies of how taxes effect any measure of the economy are notoriously sensitive to the
selection of controls used in the regression model.5 If a tax rate is correlated to both the
omitted variable and productivity, the tax rates estimated effect on productivity will be biased.
Including additional controls reduces the likelihood of omitted variable bias.
Crain and Lee (1999) implement an extreme-bounds analysis to assess the sensitivity of
numerous control variables identified in the state growth literature. All the controls used in
this study are taken directly from the study by Crain.
Crain recommends nine distinct control groups for inclusion in a state growth model. Of
the nine groups, three are not included in this study. These three groups are cultural/ethnic
characteristics, fiscal policy, and public and private capital. The first group is ignored because
it isn’t relevant in determining a state’s value of labor. The second control group includes
controls for a state’s fiscal policy, but the proxies suggested by Crain are already controlled for
by the state’s tax policy.6 A measure of a state’s capital accumulation would cause problems
for this model. If taxes affect productivity it will do so in part by reducing the capital invested
in the state. Including capital as a control would diminish the tax effect on productivity by
not allowing the tax effect on capital accumulation to take its toll of productivity.
The six remaining groups recommended by Crain are included in the base model. These
control groups are called education, size of work force, energy prices, industrial composition,
pressure groups, and public choice. Of these six control groups the first three include only one
proxy to choose from, again referencing Crain. The last three groups contain three proxies
each. For example, the three proxies proposed by Crain for controlling for a state’s industrial
composition include an index called industrial diversity, the manufacturing share of GSP, and
service share of GSP. For those three groups that contain multiple proxies, only one proxy
5For example, Mofidi (1990) argues that government expenditures play a significant role in determining
accurate tax effects on productivity.
6State tax expenditures are highly correlated with state tax revenues.
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can ultimately be chosen for inclusion in the base model due to the high level of correlation
between proxies in a group. No special analysis tool is used to choose from between the multiple
proxies proposed by Crain in each control group. Each proxy is considered based only on its
interpretability and relevance. A description and discussion of every proxy considered for the
base model is included in the next chapter.
6.5 Discussion of unobservables
The base model includes six control groups, four tax rates, and dummies for states and
years. However, there may still be important factors that are not controlled for in the base
model. These factors could, by their omission, bias the estimated tax effects on productivity
produced by the base model. The study conducted by Crain and Lee (1999) is used to narrow
the scope of controls considered to only those that are the most relevant. The base model does
not consider any other measures because Crain’s analysis, which claims to be comprehensive,
does not find any other measure to be relevant enough to include in his recommendation. Even
still, the vast literature on tax policy includes many other variables that are not included in
this analysis.
A nearly exhaustive literature review finds the following papers to include controls in a
state growth model that were not used in this analysis. Glaeser (1992) uses a wider variety
of controls for industrial composition that he finds to be significant. Barro (1996) finds lower
fertility rates to increase productivity. Chirinko (2006) finds a relationship between capital
and productivity. Modifi (1990) argues that government expenditures play a significant role
in determining accurate tax effects on productivity, although doing so in this study would
be difficult because tax collection and use have such a high correlation (ex. local property
taxes typically fund local schools). Hseih (2006) strengthens the argument that costs of real
investment hamper productivity. Bauer (2006) argues that “knowledge stocks”, which in-
clude patents owned within the state in addition to human capital, are the biggest factor in
determining productivity.
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CHAPTER 7. Constructing Empirical Model Variables
This chapter outlines the construction of every variable used in the empirical section of
the thesis. A complete list of data sources and summarized methods for constructing each
variable considered for the empirical models can be found at the end of the chapter in table
7.3. Descriptive statistics for all variables can be found at the end of the chapter in table 7.2.
7.1 Constructing labor productivity
The Census Bureau defines labor productivity as gross domestic product per hour worked.
Unfortunately, hourly data by state is unavailable. As a substitute, state gross domestic prod-
uct is divided by the working population instead of total hours worked. For this approximation
to be accurate, the average number of hours worked per working person must be equal across
states.
Figure 7.1 shows how the average growth in state productivity, gross state product, and
working population change over time from 1977 to 2004. The average state labor productivity
growth rate was 1.26% with a range of 0.21% in Montana to 2.51% in Delaware. The standard
deviation of average state growth rates in any given year is 2.48%. Productivity growth rates
for any one year range from -11.08% in Wyoming (1985) to 17.64% in North Dakota (1980).
Productivity has a smaller average growth rate than gross domestic product because of the
1.88% average growth rate in the working population. In a single year, average productivity
growth got as low as -1% from 1981 to 1982, and as high as 3.46% from 1983 to 1984. The
volatility of state productivity has decreased since 1984.
Bauer (2006) discusses the construction and summary of state productivity data for the
years 1977 - 2004 in more detail.
37
1980 1985 1990 1995 2000
−
0.
02
0.
00
0.
02
0.
04
0.
06
0.
08
Year
G
ro
wt
h 
Ra
te
GSP
Productivity
Employment
Figure 7.1 Average productivity over time: Each data point is the
average of the 48 contiguous United States. A state’s produc-
tivity is calculated by dividing gross state product by the state’s
working population.
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7.2 Constructing a state’s tax policy
State and local governments are free to make up whatever tax laws they see fit within fairly
loose bounds set by the federal government. The result is a plethora of different tax laws and
little hope of a simple tax proxy. Households and firms are subject to different tax rates and
exemptions. Loopholes and fine print are plentiful enough for many lifetimes of study.
The purpose of this section is to construct measures for tax levies on income, property,
capital gains, and consumption that are meaningful and as close to capturing the average
marginal tax rate faced by households and firms in each state as possible. Taxes on income
and capital gains are proxied by maximum marginal rates imposed by the state. Taxes on
property and consumption are proxied by a rate roughly proportional to the average effective
rate. Taxes on corporate profits are controlled for using a dummy variable for if the state
imposes any corporate taxes at all. Table 7.4 summarizes each state’s choice to use the five
tax levies considered in this analysis.
Capital gains
The proxy used for the capital gains tax rate is the maximum marginal rate imposed at
the state level. The maximum rate must be a good indicator of other rates for this measure
to be an unbiased estimator of the underlying effective marginal tax rate. If some states have
extremely high maximum tax rates relative to their other rates, such as their minimum rate,
this estimator will consistently overestimate the average marginal capital gains tax rate. For
example, say a state has three tax brackets; 1% for people making less than $10,000, 2% for
people making between $10,000 and $1,000,000, and a maximum income tax rate of 10% for
people making more than $1,000,000. Using the maximum marginal tax rate of 10%, in this
case, would not be a good indicator of the state’s income tax rate. This is an extreme case.
Marginal tax rates generally increase, but do not usually “jump” as this example supposes.
Defining taxes on capital gains is complex because some capital gains are considered income,
and thus subject to income taxes, while others fall under the capital gains tax. The definition
of income has changed repeatedly since 1977. From 1979 to 1986 only 40% of short term capital
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gains were considered as part of income.1 After the 1986 tax reform act, all short term capital
gains were considered to be a part of income, however, long-term capital gains on assets sold
after May 1997 fall under the capital gains tax. This issue is complex.2
1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
0.
00
0.
02
0.
04
0.
06
Year
Ta
x 
R
at
e
Income Tax
Property Tax
Sales Tax
Capital Gains Tax
Figure 7.2 Average state tax rates over time: Each data point is the
average tax rate of all 48 contiguous states in a given year. The
jump in capital gains taxes in due to the tax reform act of 1986.
The one year jump in the property tax rate is due to a one year
drop in housing value that quickly recovered.
1Short term generally refers to assets that have a duration of less than one year
2For a detailed understanding of what is included in the income tax see Auten (1999).
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Figure 7.3 Capital gains tax rates: States without any tax on capital
gains include Florida, Nevada, New Hampshire, South Dakota,
Tennessee, Texas, Washington, and Wyoming. These states
never levied a capital gains tax from 1977 to 2004. No other
state removed their capital gains tax, even for a year. State level
capital gains taxes have stayed below 12% except for Wisconsin
whose capital gains tax rate rose to above 15% until 1982.
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Corporate profits
Taxes on corporate profits are controlled for using a binary variable. If a state levies
any taxes on corporate profits then the state receives a “1”. This measure is used because
accurate marginal and average corporate tax rates could not be constructed given the current
availability of data. Corporations often span multiple states. This makes it easy for them to
take advantage of differences in each states tax code, and perhaps allocate more revenue to the
lowest taxed states. If corporations regularly take advantage of differences in state tax codes,
any constructed average using corporate tax revenues would be inaccurate. For these reasons
this work controls for the effects of corporate taxes using a binary variable for whether the
state levies any corporate income tax at all. The corporate tax dummy can only be included
in a version of the empirical model that uses random instead of fixed state effects to avoid
multicollinearity.
Income
The income tax rate is proxied by the maximum marginal income tax rate imposed at
the state level. Capital gains taxes are also captured by the maximum marginal rate. Both
measures ignore taxes levied at the county level. As previously mentioned, the definition of
income has always included some amount of short term capital gains. Income also includes
retirement benefits and small business income. Retirement benefits and small business income
made up lass than 20% of the average household’s income in 2005.3 The theoretical model
definition of wage income does not include capital gains. To adjust for this fact, tax effects on
wage income from the theoretical model are recalculated using a weighted average of capital
income and wage income such that income = 84.7% wage income + 15.3% capital income.
The states without any tax on income are the same as those that don’t have a capital gains
tax with the exception of Connecticut, which had an income tax from 1977 until 1990.
3The values come from a report by The Tax Foundation at www.taxfoundation.org for the year 2005.
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Figure 7.4 Income tax rates: The states without any tax on income are
the same as those that don’t have a capital gains tax. The only
addition being the state of Connecticut which had an income
tax from 1977 until 1990. Income tax rates at the state level
have been under 12% for all states except for Delaware which
had an income tax rate between 13% and 20% before 1985.
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Sales plus excise
Sales and excise taxes are both taxes on consumption. For this reason, both rates are
captured by one proxy. This is done by adding sales and excise receipts at the state and local
level together. Sales plus excise tax receipts are then divided by total state income. The proxy
for the sales plus excise tax rate is the average portion of total income spent on sales and excise
taxes within a state. Figure 7.5 shows the sales plus excise tax rates to be more volatile than
other tax rates because sales tax receipts are highly cyclical.
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Figure 7.5 Sales plus excise tax rates: The spread of sales plus excise
tax rates increased from 1977 to 2004.
44
Property
The proxy used for the property tax rate is an approximation of the state’s average effective
property tax rate. The property tax rate is calculated by dividing state and local property
tax receipts by an approximation of the state’s total value of property. A state’s total value
of property is approximated by the state’s median home value, multiplied by the number
of households in the state. This approximation underestimates the total value of a state’s
property because median home values are smaller than average. The census bureau does not
report historical data on average home values.
This ranking of state’s based on their property tax rate for the year 2004 is compared to
a ranking made by Siniavskaia (2007), who estimates property tax rates for the year 2005.
Siniavskaia’s ranking divides median property tax receipts by median home value. This cal-
culation of a property tax rate is both accurate and easily interpretable. Unfortunately, this
calculation cannot be made for all the years in this data set given the lack of data on median
tax receipts. However, this problem does not seem to prevent this work’s calculation from pro-
ducing a similar result. The correlation between Siniavskaia’s ranking and this work’s ranking
is .75. The correlation between Siniavskaia’s property tax rates and this work’s rates is .74.
These comparison’s are summarized in table 7.1 below. The difference of one year between
when Siniavskaia’s rankings are estimated and this work’s estimation is negligible. Even if
the difference were significant, it would only mean that this work’s measure for property taxes
likely has an even higher correlation with Siniavskaia’s rankings.
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State Siniavskaia’s Our rate Siniavskaia’s Our Ranking
Rate* (2005) (2004) Ranking
Alabama 0.31% 1.01% 49 48
Arizona 0.61% 2.09% 37 25
Arkansas 0.53% 1.27% 42 45
California 0.48% 1.27% 45 38
Colorado 0.58% 1.65% 38 35
Connecticut 1.42% 2.71% 10 13
Delaware 0.40% 1.06% 47 47
Florida 0.79% 2.65% 28 17
Georgia 0.71% 2.19% 32 23
Idaho 0.91% 2.09% 24 29
Illinois 1.58% 2.64% 7 15
Indiana 0.94% 2.41% 23 20
Iowa 1.27% 2.86% 12 14
Kansas 1.24% 3.26% 13 6
Kentucky 0.67% 1.35% 36 44
Louisiana 0.17% 1.38% 51 42
Maine 1.12% 3.54% 18 4
Maryland 0.77% 1.86% 29 31
Massachusetts 0.82% 1.90% 25 26
Michigan 1.24% 2.38% 14 21
Minnesota 0.81% 1.92% 27 33
Mississippi 0.50% 2.10% 44 30
Missouri 0.82% 1.89% 26 32
Montana 1.00% 2.43% 20 19
Nebraska 1.67% 2.95% 3 9
Nevada 0.51% 2.17% 43 18
New Hampshire 1.63% 3.55% 5 2
New Jersey 1.60% 3.10% 6 7
New Mexico 0.56% 1.09% 40 46
New York 1.19% 2.71% 16 3
North Carolina 0.76% 1.67% 30 37
North Dakota 1.50% 2.54% 8 16
Ohio 1.23% 2.10% 15 27
Oklahoma 0.71% 1.51% 31 39
Oregon 0.95% 1.60% 22 34
Pennsylvania 1.47% 2.31% 9 22
Rhode Island 1.09% 2.79% 19 8
South Carolina 0.57% 2.29% 39 24
South Dakota 1.38% 2.74% 11 12
Tennessee 0.70% 1.55% 33 40
Texas 1.82% 4.20% 2 1
Utah 0.68% 1.53% 34 41
Vermont 1.64% 3.08% 4 10
Virginia 0.67% 2.02% 35 28
Washington 0.99% 1.55% 21 36
West Virginia 0.46% 1.49% 46 43
Wisconsin 1.82% 2.83% 1 11
Wyoming 0.55% 3.32% 41 5
Table 7.1 Testing the accuracy of the property tax rate: Natalia
Siniavskaia’s (2007) study on property tax rates uses median
tax receipt as a percent of median home value for the year 2005.
The correlation between our estimates and Siniavskaia’s is .756
for the rates and .745 for the rankings.
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Figure 7.6 Property tax rates: As a group, states have increased their
property tax rates steadily from 1977 to 2004. Wyoming is
the exception, having a property tax rate higher than 6% in
1986. All average state property tax rates have been under 2%,
although individual counties may have higher rates.
47
7.3 Constructing proxies for control groups
Six characteristics of each state are controlled for including education, size of work force,
industrial composition, pressure groups, public choice, and energy prices in addition to year
and state dummies. These controls are suggested by Crain (1999) who conducts an extreme-
bounds analysis to estimate the sensitivity of control variables commonly cited in the state
growth literature. Twelve controls are defined and discussed in this section.
Education and size of work force
Crain recommends using controls for education and the size of the state’s work force. Work
force size is the percent of the total population between the ages 18 and 64. Education is the
sum of high school and four year college graduates as a percent of the total population. This
aggregation of high school and college graduates allows the percentage to exceed 100%. Both
measures are used in the base model.
Industrial composition
Crain suggests three measures of industrial composition including industrial diversity, share
of gross state product (GSP) from the manufacturing sector, and share of GSP from services.
Industrial diversity is computed using the formula below. The more GSP is evenly spread across
sectors the smaller the indicator. Manufacturing and service share of GSP is the portion of
GSP produced in that sector.
Diversity =
(
MiningGSP
PivateIndustry
)2
+
(
ConstructionGSP
PrivateIndustryGSP
)2
+
(
ManufacturingGSP
PrivateIndustryGSP
)2
+
(
Transportation&UtilitiesGSP
PrivateIndustryGSP
)2
+
(
Wholesale&RetailT radeGSP
PrivateIndustryGSP
)2
+
(
FIREGSP
PrivateIndustryGSP
)2
+
(
ServiceGSP
PrivateIndustryGSP
)2
Of the three measures for industrial composition, only the share of GSP from manufac-
turing is used in the base model. The primary reason for this is that the interpretation is
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straightforward and not nearly as complicated to define as the index for industrial diversity.
Share of GSP from the service sector is also straight forward to interpret, but only one measure
can be used.
Pressure groups
All the pressure groups analyzed in Crain (1999) are related to unions and include the
existence of right-to-work laws, union membership density, and union membership coverage.
Right-to-work laws prevent unions and employers from forcing all employees to pay union
membership fees. A total of 18 states had right-to-work laws in 1977. Since then, Idaho,
Oklahoma and Texas have passed right-to-work laws as well. Union membership density is the
percent of each state’s non-agricultural employees who are union members. Union membership
coverage is the percentage of each state’s non-agricultural employees who are covered by a
collective bargaining agreement.4 Union membership density is the variable used to control
for pressure groups in the base model. Its definition is simple and it carries more information
than a dummy variable like right-to-work laws.
Public choice
Crain suggests three proxies for the control group public choice including population den-
sity, urbanization, and interstate commuting. Population density is the number of people per
square mile. Urbanization is the percent of the population that is in an urban setting. The
definition of interstate commuting is not clear from Crain (1999) and is therefore dropped
from consideration. Population density is used in the base model over urbanization because
its calculation does not rely on arbitrary cut-off for defining an area as urban versus rural.
Energy prices
Crain suggests only one proxy for energy prices. The energy price proxy is calculated using
prices of fuel and electricity for the industrial sector. The precise calculation is explained
4Barry T. Hirsch, David A. Macpherson, and Wayne G. Vroman (2001) originally compiled these estimates.
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by the United States Energy Information Administration,www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/sep/, in the
State Energy Price and Expenditure Report.
7.4 Descriptive statistics, data sources, and state tax policies at a glance
Data mean median std min max
log productivity 10.768 10.747 0.170 10.416 11.431
income 0.052 0.057 0.033 0.000 0.198
sales plus excise 0.025 0.026 0.010 0.000 0.057
capital gains 0.043 0.043 0.030 0.000 0.164
corporate binary 0.917 1.000 0.276 0.000 1.000
property 0.007 0.006 0.003 0.001 0.018
Primary Controls mean median std min max
labor force 0.615 0.616 0.021 0.552 0.661
education 0.959 0.973 0.131 0.553 1.290
manufacturing share of GSP 0.170 0.177 0.098 0.000 0.536
population density 172.042 82.133 238.898 4.238 1170.927
union density 15.313 14.500 6.918 2.800 38.300
real energy prices 11.865 11.469 2.440 6.315 21.665
Extra Controls mean median std min max
industry diversity 0.183 0.181 0.046 0.103 0.576
service share GDP 0.168 0.164 0.045 0.059 0.346
urbanization 0.686 0.690 0.147 0.321 0.961
interstate commuting 0.006 0.001 0.028 -0.075 0.134
union coverage 17.489 16.800 7.199 3.600 39.900
right-to-work laws 0.402 0.000 0.490 0.000 1.000
Table 7.2 Panel data descriptive statistics
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Variable Source Method
log productivity BEA logged state GDP
income NBER maximum marginal income tax rate at the state level
sales plus excise taxpolicycenter.org sales plus excise tax receipts per percent income
capital gains NBER maximum marginal capital gains tax rate
corporate binary taxpolicycenter.org binary for if state imposes a tax on corporate profits
property CB divide state and local property tax receipts by an
approximation of the states total value of property
Controls Source Method
Labor Force BLS share of total population 18-64 on July 1st
education CB data for each decade linearized
manufacturing BEA 1963-1997 data come from the SIC. 1998-2004
share of GSP data was estimated portion of GSP from service sector
using growth
rates of NAICS
population density CB people per square mile
union density CB the percentage of each state’s
nonagricultural employees who are union members.
data by decade, intervening years interpolated, 2000
and beyond extrapolated.
real energy prices EIA data in dollars per million BTU
Extra Controls Source Method
industry diversity BEA index of each sector’s share of GDP
service share GDP BEA 1963-1997 data comes from the SIC. 1998-2004
data was estimated using growth rates of NAICS
urbanization CS Percent of population living in an urban area
interstate commuting BEA see BEA website
union coverage Hirsch (2001) the percentage of each state’s
nonagricultural employees covered by a collective
bargaining intervening years interpolated
right-to-work laws DOL Binary for if state has right-to-work laws
Table 7.3 Panel data sources and methods for construction:Bureau
of Labor Statistics (BLS), National Bureau of Economic Re-
search (NBER), Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA), Energy
Information Administration (EIA), North American Industry
Classification System (NAICS), Department of Labor (DOL).
Tax Policy Center (taxpolicycenter.org)
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State Property Income Capital Gains Sales or Excise Corporate Profits
Alabama Always Always Always Always Always
Arizona Always Always Always Always Always
Arkansas Always Always Always Always Always
California Always Always Always Always Always
Colorado Always Always Always Always Always
Connecticut Always Sometimes Always Always Always
Delaware Always Always Always Always Always
Florida Always Never Never Always Always
Georgia Always Always Always Always Always
Idaho Always Always Always Always Always
Illinois Always Always Always Always Always
Indiana Always Always Always Always Always
Iowa Always Always Always Always Always
Kansas Always Always Always Always Always
Kentucky Always Always Always Always Always
Louisiana Always Always Always Always Always
Maine Always Always Always Always Always
Maryland Always Always Always Always Always
Massachusetts Always Always Always Always Always
Michigan Always Always Always Always Always
Minnesota Always Always Always Always Always
Mississippi Always Always Always Always Always
Missouri Always Always Always Always Always
Montana Always Always Always Always Always
Nebraska Always Always Always Always Always
Nevada Always Never Never Always Never
New Hampshire Always Never Never Always Always
New Jersey Always Always Always Always Always
New Mexico Always Always Always Always Always
New York Always Always Always Always Always
North Carolina Always Always Always Always Always
North Dakota Always Always Always Always Always
Ohio Always Always Always Always Always
Oklahoma Always Always Always Always Always
Oregon Always Always Always Always Always
Pennsylvania Always Always Always Always Always
Rhode Island Always Always Always Always Always
South Carolina Always Always Always Always Always
South Dakota Always Never Never Always Always
Tennessee Always Never Never Always Always
Texas Always Never Never Always Never
Utah Always Always Always Always Always
Vermont Always Always Always Always Always
Virginia Always Always Always Always Always
Washington Always Never Never Always Never
West Virginia Always Always Always Always Always
Wisconsin Always Always Always Always Always
Wyoming Always Never Never Always Never
Table 7.4 State tax policies at a glance: All states utilize taxes on property
and sales or excise, but only some states utilize taxes on income, capital
gains, and corporate profits. Connecticut is the only state to have ever
removed a tax entirely from its tax policy from 1977 to 2004.
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CHAPTER 8. Empirical Model Results and Robustness Checks
The base model constructed in the previous chapter six offer many insights into how state
tax policy affects a state’s labor productivity. Nine additional versions of the base model are
included and discussed to test the robustness of model results to alternative lags and method
for modeling state effects.
The base model is designed to test the results of the theoretical model developed in chapters
two through five. Among other findings, two results of the theoretical model are confirmed by
the base model: Taxes on capital, which include property and capital gains, are more disruptive
to productivity than taxes on income and consumption (sales and excise). Property taxes are
found by all perturbation of the base model to be the most disruptive to productivity, and
taxes on consumption are found to have relatively benign effects compared to all other taxes.
The base model is used to construct a ranking of states based on how seriously their tax
policies disrupt productivity. States that tax capital more heavily and have higher tax rates
in general are ranked lower than states that rely more heavily on consumption taxes and
generally have lower tax rates. More than 10% of the variation in a rankings of state by
growth in productivity can be explained by the ranking of states based on tax policy. This
correlation implies that state tax policy has an influence on the state’s average wage rate.
8.1 Productivity elasticity of each tax
All tax levies except those on consumption are estimated by the base model to disrupt state
productivity. Table 8.1 summarizes five versions of the base model. The base model is in bold
and is denoted as model number III. Estimates are given as an elasticity for a 10% increase
in each tax rate. For example, if income taxes in a state are increased from 5% to 5.5% (10%
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increase) then productivity in that state will fall by .25% annually. Productivity is the average
market value of an employee in a state and is proportional to wages. If an employee makes
$35,000 annually and income taxes go up from 5% to 7% (40% increase), the employee should
expect her salary to fall to $34,650, a loss of $350 all else equal.1 Other versions of the base
model presented in table 8.1 are the same as the base model in every respect except for the lag
on independent variables. Other estimates for the productivity elasticity of taxes on income
range from -.164 (five year lag) to -.425 (six year lag).
Other taxes are interpreted in a similar fashion. If taxes on property increase by 10% (say
from 2% to 2.2%) then productivity and wages are predicted by the base model to fall by
.648%. This elasticity is 2.6 times greater than the productivity elasticity of the income tax.
A 40% increase in the property tax rate (say from 2% to 2.8%) is predicted by the base model
to lower productivity in a state by 2.59% within four years. An employee previously making
$35,000 a year would experience a loss of $907.2 a year from such a tax hike.
The five regressions presented in table 8.1 are also summarized using beta estimates instead
of elasticities in table 8.2. The productivity elasticity of a tax is the derivative of logged
productivity with respect to the tax multiplied by the average tax rate.
E = β × τ =
∂log(w)
∂τ
× τ (8.1)
Tax effect estimates presented in table 8.2 are given as a beta estimate, meaning that the
results estimate what percent change in labor productivity is most likely to follow a 1% (say
2% to 3%) increase in each tax rate.2 The beta coefficient is interpreted differently for each
tax because not all taxes are constructed the same. The income tax proxy is the maximum
marginal income tax rate. The property tax proxy is proportional to the effective average
property tax rate. A 1% increase in the income tax rate has a different meaning than a 1%
1There are many factors that play into deciding what salary any particular person in a state will have. The
result of the base model is means to describe the average individual’s drop in salary, after accounting for inflation
and holding constant all other relevant factors.
2Notice that the beta estimate interpretation of a 1% change in the tax rate is different than the interpretation
of a 1% change when interpreting an elasticity, where a 1% increase meant that a tax rate of 5% would increase
to 5.05%. This is a confusing difference, but crucial to properly understanding what the difference between
tables 8.1 and 8.2.
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increase in the property tax rate. The coefficient on the income and capital gains tax is the
percent change in productivity per percent increase in the maximum marginal tax rate. The
coefficient on the sales plus excise tax rate is the percent change in productivity per percent
increase in sales tax per dollar of income earned in the state. The coefficient on the property
tax is the percent change in productivity per percent increase in the average effective property
tax rate.
The estimates in table 8.2 measure an increase of 10% on a tax rate as moving from 4% to
14%, not 4% to 4.4%. For instance, the coefficient for the income tax in table 8.2 estimates
that an increase of 1% (say from 5% to 6%) in the maximum marginal income tax rate lowers
productivity by -.481%. The average state had a maximum marginal income tax rate of 5.22%
between 1977 and 2004. The estimated loss in productivity for the average state is therefore
5.22% ∗ -0.481% = −2.51%. The average tax rates for the rest of the taxes on property,
capital gains, and sales plus excise are 1.55%, 4.28%, and 2.54% respectively. Combining
these averages with estimates from table 8.2 leads to the result that the average state loses
9.49% of its productivity annually because of its tax policy, according to the base model. This
calculation does not include any effects from taxes on corporate profits. Alternative versions
of the base model estimate only marginal differences in the average state’s annual loss in
productivity because of its tax policy as shown in table 8.1.
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Regression I II III IV V
State Effects Fixed Fixed Fixed Fixed Fixed
Lag 2 3 4 5 6
Units Elasticity Elasticity Elasticity Elasticity Elasticity
Income -0.180 -0.270 -0.251 -0.164 -0.425
(1.84) (2.14)* (1.82) (0.91) (2.27)*
Property -0.386 -0.495 -0.648 -0.315 -0.359
(3.09)** (3.11)** (3.44)** (1.44) (1.74)
Sales + Excise 0.010 0.096 0.078 -0.031 0.043
(0.15) (1.38) (0.77) (0.28) (0.37)
Capital Gains -0.128 -0.127 -0.128 -0.104 -0.006
(2.14)* (1.61) (1.45) (1.01) (0.06)
Corporate Binary β only allowed in random effects models
Education 2.100 3.183 0.451 1.141 3.145
(3.10)** (3.41)** (0.42) (1.02) (2.21)*
Work Force Size 2.016 0.270 4.690 2.926 -3.246
(1.22) (0.13) (1.77) (0.87) (1.30)
Manufacturing -0.462 -0.307 -0.404 -0.158 -0.059
Share GSP (9.13)** (4.50)** (5.42)** (1.68) (0.77)
Pop Density 3.441 3.441 3.441 3.441 1.720
(12.77)** (9.25)** (8.36)** (5.58)** (3.91)**
Union Density 0.613 0.153 0.306 -0.153 0.153
(3.16)** (0.78) (1.16) (0.43) (0.78)
Energy Prices -0.593 -0.356 -0.593 -0.356 -0.949
(1.44) (0.70) (0.96) (0.49) (1.71)
Constant β 10.097 10.184 10 10.26 10.76
(56.38)** (41.60)** (36.13)** (26.47)** (37.20)**
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 672 432 336 240 192
R-squared 0.84 0.84 0.85 0.84 0.9
Avg Tax Effect -6.84% -7.96% -9.49% -6.15% -7.46%
Joint Effect (F-Stat) 15.88 14.78 14.90 4.46 5.68
F-Test (F-Stat) 5.64 5.83 5.49 1.23 2.29
Table 8.1 Base model elasticities: The level model is in bold with a
lag of four years placed on all independent variables. The rest
of the regressions are the same except for a change in lag on
the independent variables. Estimates are given as elasticity in
productivity from a 10% increase in each tax rate.
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Regression I II III IV V
State Effects Fixed Fixed Fixed Fixed Fixed
Lag 2 3 4 5 6
Units Beta Beta Beta Beta Beta
Income -0.344 -0.517 -0.481 -0.315 -0.814
(1.84) (2.14)* (1.82) (0.91) (2.27)*
Property -2.495 -3.195 -4.186 -2.037 -2.317
(3.09)** (3.11)** (3.44)** (1.44) (1.74)
Sales + Excise 0.041 0.376 0.308 -0.122 0.170
(0.15) (1.38) (0.77) (0.28) (0.37)
Capital Gains -0.300 -0.297 -0.300 -0.243 -0.013
(2.14)* (1.61) (1.45) (1.01) (0.06)
Corporate Binary only allowed in random effects models
Education 0.219 0.332 0.047 0.119 0.328
(3.10)** (3.41)** (0.42) (1.02) (2.21)*
Work Force Size 0.328 0.044 0.763 0.476 -0.528
(1.22) (0.13) (1.77) (0.87) (1.30)
Manufacturing -0.272 -0.181 -0.238 -0.093 -0.035
Share GSP (9.13)** (4.50)** (5.42)** (1.68) (0.77)
Pop Density 0.0020 0.0020 0.0020 0.0020 0.0010
(12.77)** (9.25)** (8.36)** (5.58)** (3.91)**
Union Density 0.004 0.001 0.002 -0.001 0.001
(3.16)** (0.78) (1.16) (0.43) (0.78)
Energy Prices -0.005 -0.003 -0.005 -0.003 -0.008
(1.44) (0.70) (0.96) (0.49) (1.71)
Constant 10.064 10.155 9.959 10.278 10.737
(56.63)** (41.76)** (36.28)** (26.71)** (37.39)**
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 672 432 336 240 192
R-squared 0.84 0.84 0.85 0.84 0.9
Avg Tax Effect -6.84% -7.96% -9.49% -6.15% -7.46%
Joint Effect (F-Stat) 15.88 14.78 14.90 4.46 5.68
F-Test (F-Stat) 5.64 5.83 5.49 1.23 2.29
Table 8.2 Base model beta estimates: The level model is in bold with
a lag of four years placed on all independent variables. The rest
of the regressions are the same except for the lag on the indepen-
dent variables. Estimates are given as elasticity in productivity
from a 10% increase in each tax rate.
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8.2 Fixed v.s. random effects
This section discusses the choice of using fixed effects instead of random effects in the base
model. The base model uses fixed effects that assume the characteristics of a state that are
not controlled for have the same effect on productivity every year. The alternative would be
to assume that the state’s characteristics have an effect on productivity that varies some over
time.
There are three common methods that can be applied to the base model in order to control
for omitted variable bias. These three ways are called fixed, between, and random effects.
Fixed effects are simply dummy variables for all but one of the states. Fixed effects are used
for controlling omitted variables that differ between states, but are constant for each state over
time. A state’s geographical characteristics are a great example of characteristics that fixed
effects are good at controlling for. Between effects are nothing more than dummy variables
for all but one of the years. Between effects are used to control for omitted variables that
change over time, but are the same for all states. Federal tax policy and the business cycle
are two examples of variables that are easily controlled for by using between effects. The last
way is to use random effects. Random effects are a substitute for fixed effects. Fixed effects,
by using binary variables, assume that the joint effect of each state’s omitted variables doesn’t
vary over time. Random effects assume that the joint effect of each state’s omitted variables
can vary over time. Fixed effects are generally used if the modeler is interested in making
explicit comparisons between states. Random effects are generally used when the modeler is
more interested in measuring the extent to which the random factor (in this case a state’s
unchanging characteristics) accounts for variance in productivity, the dependent variable, in
order to control for it. The key issue between fixed and random effects is whether the effects of
a state’s omitted characteristics are thought of as being a draw from a probability distribution
of such effects. If so, the effect is random.
Many aspects of a state are clearly not fixed from year to year. For example, the weather will
always be different and have an impact on the productivity of the agricultural sector. Weather
patterns are different in every state, so between effects could not be used in conjunction with
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fixed effects to perfectly capture this difference in each state. For this reason, five additional
versions of the base model are constructed that use random instead of fixed effects. These
additional five models, which are summarized in tables 8.3 and 8.4, provide additional insights
into the robustness of the base model. The random effects models are also useful because they
allow the use of corporate tax dummies. All the states that levy corporate taxes have never
changed their policy. For this reason the corporate tax dummy cannot coincide with the state’s
fixed effects control, which is nothing more than a dummy variable itself.
Regression number VIII in table 8.4 finds that a state that levies any corporate taxes will
lose -0.12% productivity annually. If an employee makes $35,000 annually and the state decides
to start levying taxes on corporate profits than the employee should expect her salary to fall
to $34,958, a loss of $42 all else equal. The amount of the corporate tax will matter of course.
If a state levies taxes more than the average state, this loss will be higher. The corporate tax
dummy is only capable of measuring the loss sustained by the average average tax rate levied
on corporate taxes.
There is at least one problem with using a random effects model. If uncontrolled char-
acteristics of a state are correlated with state tax policy then the tax effect estimates are
both biased and inconsistent. This correlation is tested using a Hausman test which finds the
random effects model to be biased and inconsistent.
Hausman test
The null hypothesis is that the estimated coefficients under a fixed effects model equal
those of the random effects model. This is equivalent to the hypothesis that both estimates
are consistent and unbiased. The alternative hypothesis is that the coefficients are not equal.
The Hausman statistic is as follows:
H = T (b0 − b1)
′V ar(b0 − b1)
−1(b0 − b1) ≈ x
2(15)
Where T is the number of observations. Variables b0 and b1 are vectors of coefficients from
the fixed effects model and the random effect model respectively. The computed Hausman
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statistic is 186.42.
P − value = Prob(H > 186.42)2 = 0.0000
The result rejects the null hypothesis in favor of the alternative that coefficients are signifi-
cantly different under the two models. This means that coefficient estimates using the random
effects model are biased and inconsistent due to a correlation between the state’s uncontrolled
effects and the state’s tax policy.
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Regression VI VII VIII IX X
State Effects Random Random Random Random Random
Lag 2 3 4 5 6
Elasticity Elasticity Elasticity Elasticity Elasticity
Income -0.209 -0.269 -0.237 -0.099 -0.360
(2.03)* (2.10)* (1.69) (0.56) (2.06)*
Property -0.489 -0.639 -0.757 -0.687 -0.523
(4.03)** (4.00)** (4.03)** (3.11)** (2.48)*
Sales + Excise 0.011 0.053 0.041 -0.023 -0.019
(0.11) (0.74) (0.35) (0.17) (0.12)
Capital Gains -0.102 -0.089 -0.087 -0.080 0.027
(1.59) (1.08) (0.93) (0.79) (0.26)
Corporate Binary β -0.126 -0.118 -0.120 -0.129 -0.106
(2.47)* (2.30)* (2.26)* (2.44)* (2.06)*
Education 3.173 3.988 2.291 1.917 3.269
(4.78)** (4.70)** (2.35)* (1.86) (2.98)**
Work Force Size -3.202 -3.614 0.068 0.910 -2.698
(2.16)* (1.92) (0.05) (0.39) (1.29)
Manufacturing -0.557 -0.418 -0.494 -0.244 -0.117
Share GSP (10.37)** (5.84)** (6.35)** (2.62)** (1.50)
Pop Density 0.860 0.688 0.688 0.516 0.688
(8.44)** (7.40)** (6.56)** (5.90)** (7.01)**
Union Density 0.613 0.306 0.459 0.306 0.306
(3.84)** (1.72) (2.22)* (1.35) (1.81)
Energy Prices -1.424 -1.187 -1.187 -0.831 -0.949
(3.38)** (2.34)* (2.15)* (1.19) (2.00)*
Constant β 10.986 10.957 10.92 10.63 10.896
(60.58)** (51.04)** (43.23)** (37.11)** (47.89)**
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 672 432 336 240 192
R-squared N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
Avg Tax Effect -7.99% -9.54% -10.51% -9.01% -8.86%
Joint Effect (F-Stat) 19.40 20.49 18.05 11.05 8.97
F-Test (F-Stat) 25.82 26.05 24.02 14.03 11.55
Hausman Test 0.0439 0 0 0.0001 0
Table 8.3 Elasticities using random effects: These five regressions are
the same as the base model except that each state’s effect on pro-
ductivity is assumed to be a random variables instead of a fixed
value. Estimates are given as an elasticity for a 10% increase in
each tax rate (say from 5% to 5.5%). The estimate for the cor-
porate binary variable gives the estimated percentage change in
productivity for if the state levies any taxes on corporate profits.
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Regression VI VII VIII IX X
State Effects Random Random Random Random Random
Lag 2 3 4 5 6
Units Beta Beta Beta Beta Beta
Income -0.400 -0.515 -0.455 -0.190 -0.690
(2.07)* (2.13)* (1.74) (0.61) (2.10)*
Property -3.157 -4.126 -4.889 -4.439 -3.381
(3.78)** (4.01)** (4.09)** (3.53)** (2.68)**
Sales + Excise 0.045 0.210 0.161 -0.089 -0.075
(0.15) (0.72) (0.38) (0.19) (0.16)
Capital Gains -0.238 -0.209 -0.203 -0.188 0.062
(1.57) (1.06) (0.92) (0.75) (0.27)
Corporate Binary -0.126 -0.118 -0.120 -0.129 -0.106
(2.47)* (2.30)* (2.26)* (2.44)* (2.06)*
Education 0.331 0.416 0.239 0.200 0.341
(4.83)** (4.77)** (2.44)* (2.05)* (3.05)**
Work Force Size -0.521 -0.588 0.011 0.148 -0.439
(2.00)* (1.85) (0.03) (0.33) (1.29)
Manufacturing -0.328 -0.246 -0.291 -0.144 -0.069
Share GSP (10.39)** (5.83)** (6.33)** (2.56)* (1.47)
Pop Density 0.0005 0.0004 0.0004 0.0003 0.0004
(8.31)** (7.26)** (6.42)** (5.76)** (6.91)**
Union Density 0.004 0.002 0.003 0.002 0.002
(3.78)** (1.68) (2.17)* (1.32) (1.81)
Energy Prices -0.012 -0.010 -0.010 -0.007 -0.008
(3.41)** (2.39)* (2.24)* (1.28) (2.04)*
Constant 10.954 10.94 10.897 10.643 10.889
(60.74)** (51.21)** (43.47)** (37.40)** (48.24)**
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 672 432 336 240 192
R-squared N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
Avg Tax Effect -7.99% -9.54% -10.51% -9.01% -8.86%
Joint Effect (F-Stat) 19.40 20.49 18.05 11.05 8.97
F-Test (F-Stat) 25.82 26.05 24.02 14.03 11.55
Hausman 0.0439 0 0 0.0001 0
Table 8.4 Beta estimates using random effects: These five regressions
are the same as the base model except that each state’s effect
on productivity is assumed to be a random variables instead of
a fixed value. Estimates are interpreted as a beta.
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8.3 Measuring productivity as a growth rate
The growth model is the same as the base model save two differences. Productivity and the
six control groups are measured as a change (or growth rate) over a three year period rather
than a level (or total) for the base model. Thus, the growth model takes the following form.
∆wt+3 = β0 +
4∑
y=1
βy (τy)t +
10∑
n=5
βn (∆Cn−4)t +
57∑
m=11
βm (Sm−10) +
84∑
j=58
βj (Yj−58)t + t (8.2)
The primary purpose of including the growth model is to test the results of the base model.
The base model and the growth model ask the same question: Does a state’s tax policy have
an impact on productivity? The only difference between the two models is how they ask the
question. The growth model measures the change in productivity that results from the previous
period’s tax policy where the previous period is three years back. In contrast, the base model
measures the level of productivity that results from the previous period’s tax policy where the
previous period is four years back.
The growth model elasticity results are summarized in table 8.5 for comparison with the
base model. Results as beta estimates are summarized in table 8.6. The growth model regresses
the change in logged productivity over the interval t0 to t+3 on the change in control values
over the interval t−3 to t0 and on tax rates in t0. This is a more stringent model then the base
model which regresses logged productivity in t3 on tax rates and controls in t0. The result is
that all the significance levels and most of the estimates drop significantly.
The income and property tax rates are still estimated to have a negative effect on produc-
tivity, however, the significance of the tax policy affect on productivity drops for the growth
model compared to the base model.
The effect of taxes on sales is still considered small under the growth model, but is now
estimated to have a negative albeit insignificant effect on productivity. The growth model
contradicts the level model in its estimation of the capital gains tax effect. The level model
estimated taxes on capital gains to have a negative and sometimes statistically significant
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effect on productivity depending on the lag used. The growth model estimates a positive effect
although still insignificant.
Two tests are conducted on the joint effect of all four tax levies. The first test is a simple F-
test to see whether all the tax coefficients were zero. The second tests whether the average state
tax policy significantly effects state productivity. This second test is conducted by multiplying
the average tax rate by the estimated coefficient for the growth model. Both versions of the
growth model estimate the joint effect of taxes on productivity to be significant at the 10%
level. The F-test always comes up significant at the 10% level as well.
A random effects version of the growth model includes taxes on corporate profits. The
corporate tax is estimated to be very small and insignificant. The reason for this is that
there is absolutely no variation in whether a state taxes corporate profits. Until there is more
variation is state corporate tax law it will be difficult to pin down its effect on productivity
using time series analysis.
8.4 Comparing theoretical and empirical model results
The property tax has by far the largest negative impact on productivity according to both
the empirical models and all three theoretical model simulations. The two approaches also
agree that taxes on consumption (sales and excise taxes) are the most benign. The level
model actually shows a positive relationship between taxes on consumption and productivity,
although this relationship is not significant, and not robust to other perturbations of the level
model.
The two approaches differ in their rankings for taxes on income and capital gains. The
base model estimates the income tax effect to be larger than that of capital gains, while the
theoretical model simulations estimate the opposite.
While there are some differences in these estimates, two results are clear. At current tax
rates, an increase in property taxes will have a much stronger negative impact on productivity
than any other taxes on income and consumption. In contrast, taxes on consumption, in the
form of sales or excise taxes, will have a much smaller and possibly insignificant impact on
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Regression XI XII
State Effects Fixed Random
Units Elasticity Elasticity
Income -0.032 -0.051
(0.34) (0.89)
Property -0.284 -0.144
(2.52)* (2.40)*
Sales + Excise -0.032 -0.051
(0.53) (0.87)
Capital Gains 0.057 0.056
(1.05) (1.13)
Corporate Binary 0.128
(1.38)
Chg Education t-3 - t0 0.001 0.588
(0.79) (2.82)**
Chg Size of Work Force t-3 - t0 0.000 -0.039
(1.56) (0.61)
Chg Manufacturing Share GSP t-3 - t0 0.000 0.035
(4.44)** (5.01)**
Chg Population Density t-3 - t0 0.000 0.136
(1.48) (0.45)
Chg Union Density t-3 - t0 0.001 0.000
(1.18) (0.82)
Chg Real Energy Prices t-3 - t0 0.000 -0.004
(0.20) (2.80)**
Constant 0.062 0.01
(3.53)** (2.52)*
Year Dummies Yes Yes
Observations 384 384
R-squared 0.3 N/A
Avg Tax Effect -2.92% -0.61%
Joint Effect (F-Stat) 3.42 3.58
F-Test (F-Stat) 1.99 8.31
Table 8.5 Growth model elasticities: These five regressions model pro-
ductivity and control groups as a growth rate over three years.
Taxes are measured the same as in the base model. Estimates
are given as elasticity in productivity from a 10% increase in each
tax rate (say 5% to 5.5%). The corporate binary variable esti-
mates the change in productivity that occurs when a state levies
any taxes on corporate profits. The joint effect tests whether
the average tax effect is significant. The F-test tests the null
hypothesis that tax coefficients on income, property, sales plus
excise, and capital gains are equal to zero. Results of both tests
indicate significance at the 10% level in every regression.
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Regression XI XII
State Effects Fixed Random
Units Beta Beta
Income -0.062 -0.098
(0.34) (0.89)
Property -1.836 -0.931
(2.52)* (2.40)*
Sales + Excise -0.127 -0.199
(0.53) (0.87)
Capital Gains 0.134 0.132
(1.05) (1.13)
Corporate Binary 0.014
(1.38)
Chg Education t-3 - t0 0.149 0.274
(0.79) (2.82)**
Chg Size of Work Force t-3 - t0 -0.059 -0.011
(1.56) (0.61)
Chg Manufacturing Share GSP t-3 - t0 0.083 0.080
(4.44)** (5.01)**
Chg Population Density t-3 - t0 -0.017 0.000
(1.48) (0.45)
Chg Union Density t-3 - t0 -0.001 0.000
(1.18) (0.82)
Chg Real Energy Prices t-3 - t0 0.000 0.003
(0.20) (2.80)**
Constant 0.044 0.033
(3.53)** (2.52)*
Year Dummies Yes Yes
Observations 384 384
R-squared 0.3 N/A
Avg Tax Effect -2.92% -0.61%
Joint Effect (F-Stat) 3.42 3.58
F-Test (F-Stat) 1.99 8.31
Table 8.6 Growth model beta estimates: These five regressions model
productivity and control groups as a growth rate over three years.
Taxes are measured the same as in the base model. Estimates are
interpreted as a beta. The joint effect tests whether the average
tax effect is significant. The F-test tests the null hypothesis
that tax coefficients on income, property, sales plus excise, and
capital gains are equal to zero. Results of both tests indicate
significance at the 10% level in every regression.
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productivity compared to other tax levies.
Table 8.7 summarizes the empirical and general equilibrium model estimates of each tax
effect on productivity. The base model results are taken from table 8.2. The theoretical model
estimate is from the simulation that uses average values of model parameters found in the state
growth literature. Estimates are given as an elasticity in productivity for a 10% increase in
each tax rate (say 5% to 5.5%).
The estimated effect of taxes on productivity are much higher according to the theoretical
model. This result is partially the result of the way the theoretical model handles government
spending. In the “real world”, governments use tax revenues to finance public goods that
may create more value beyond their cost to finance. The empirical model does not control for
government spending and therefore picks up the net effect of each tax levy in its estimation.
The estimation is a net effect because it aggregates both the cost of levying each tax and the
benefit of spending its receipts. The theoretical model assumes away the existence of public
goods in order to calculate only the cost of government, and not the benefit. Largely for this
reason, the estimated effect of a tax is usually much bigger when estimated by the theoretical
model.
There is one significant difference between the tax levies used in the empirical models and
the levies in the theoretical model. The empirical models examine taxes on income, property,
sales plus excise, and capital gains while the theoretical model imposes taxes on wage income,
wealth, consumption, capital income. These tax levies are roughly analogous. Property taxes
are similar to taxes on wealth. Likewise, taxes on consumption are analogous to sales and
excise taxes. However, income taxes are a composite of wage income and primarily short term
capital income (or capital gains). Taxes on income have included different types of capital
gains since 1977 (see Auten 1999). Income that falls under the category of capital gains is
composed of “long-term” investments (more than a year) that sold after May 1997. To adjust
for this difference, income is defined as a weighted average of capital income and wage income
such that: Income = 84.7% Wage income + 15.3% Capital Income; The values come from a
report by taxfoundation.org for the year 2005.
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Method Empirical Theoretical
Model Base Regression Avg Simulation
Sales + Excise 0.08% -0.55%
Income* -0.25% -0.25%
Property -0.65% -1.07%
Capital Gains -0.13% -1.64%
Table 8.7 Comparing the empirical and theoretical models: Esti-
mates are given as an elasticity in productivity for a 10% increase
in each tax rate (say 5% to 5.5%). * Income = 84.7% Wage in-
come + 15.3% Capital Income; This calculation accommodates
the definition of income which includes short-term capital gains.
8.5 Ranking state tax policies
How do states compare in terms of the productivity of their tax policies? Rankings of
state tax policies, summarized in Table 8.8, are estimated using the base model. Rankings are
constructed by multiplying the marginal effect of each tax, as estimated by the level model in
8.2, by each state’s tax policy.
State i Total Tax Affect on Productivity = βwτ
i
w + βpτ
i
p + βkτ
i
k + βcτ
i
c (8.3)
The usefulness of the rankings is demonstrated by its ability to explain about 10% of the
variation in state productivity rankings. This correlation implies that 90% of the rest of the
variation in state productivity rankings is left for every other possible factor of productivity,
including capital accumulation, human capital, industrial composition, energy prices, popula-
tion density, unionization, crime, health, climate, geography, etc. With so many factors, 10%
being explained by tax policy alone is considerable.
A ranking of average state government size as a percent of GDP is also included. The
most productive tax policies rely on taxes levied on sales, excise and capital gains. The
top three most productive tax policies ranked using the level model are Nevada, Tennessee,
and Washington with productivity rankings of 11th, 40th, and 10th respectively. The least
productive tax policies are estimated to be those that rely heavily on taxes levied on property,
income and corporate profits. Nebraska, Iowa and Vermont have the lowest estimated tax
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policy rankings with productivity rankings of 34th, 25th and 48th respectively. Rankings of
states for specific years are summarized in table 8.9. Table 8.10 summarizes a new set of
rankings calculated using the results of the growth model presented in equation 8.2. The
correlation between the base model and growth model rankings is .73.
There is a fairly strong and negative relationship between state government size3 and pro-
ductivity. Just over 42% of the variation in state productivity can be explained by government
size. Tests on the joint effect of tax rates on productivity from the empirical models suggest
that the low productivity in a state is at least partially caused by the higher tax rates needed
to fund a larger state government.
3State government size equals total state tax revenue over gross state product.
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State Base Rank Gov. Size Productivity
Nevada 1 33 11
Tennessee 2 25 40
Washington 3 11 10
Alabama 4 6 37
Florida 5 23 33
Louisiana 6 39 2
Kentucky 7 19 21
New Mexico 8 3 14
Maryland 9 2 19
Colorado 10 17 24
Missouri 11 34 28
Pennsylvania 12 41 18
New Hampshire 13 46 43
Oklahoma 14 10 26
Utah 15 5 30
Connecticut 16 48 15
Arizona 17 14 17
Delaware 18 43 7
Arkansas 19 27 42
Mississippi 20 9 45
Virginia 21 1 31
Texas 22 32 8
Massachusetts 23 47 27
South Dakota 24 15 44
Georgia 25 18 36
West Virginia 26 20 13
Indiana 27 44 16
Illinois 28 45 5
South Carolina 29 4 47
North Carolina 30 22 41
California 31 29 6
North Dakota 32 8 38
New Jersey 33 40 9
Wyoming 34 26 1
Ohio 35 42 12
Idaho 36 16 35
Michigan 37 35 3
Minnesota 38 37 22
Rhode Island 39 28 39
Oregon 40 24 20
Kansas 41 21 32
Montana 42 7 29
New York 43 38 4
Wisconsin 44 36 23
Maine 45 13 46
Vermont 46 30 48
Iowa 47 31 25
Nebraska 48 12 34
Table 8.8 Average state tax policy rankings: These rankings are based on a
state’s average tax policy from 1977 to 2004. State tax policy rankings
explain 10% of the variation in the productivity ranking. Over 42% of
the variation in productivity ranking is explained by the ranking based
on state government size relative to state GDP.
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Base Rank 2004 2000 1990 1980 1977
Nevada 4 3 1 1 1
Tennessee 2 2 2 4 4
Washington 1 5 4 3 2
Alabama 3 1 3 6 7
Florida 13 7 5 2 3
Louisiana 5 4 7 5 5
Kentucky 8 18 8 7 8
New Mexico 7 9 16 28 26
Maryland 15 11 9 16 22
Colorado 10 15 21 8 14
Missouri 19 22 14 13 16
Pennsylvania 17 17 13 21 15
New Hampshire 34 12 10 15 10
Oklahoma 16 14 26 22 21
Utah 12 30 32 14 9
Connecticut 38 8 6 11 17
Arizona 21 21 30 10 12
Delaware 6 6 11 40 47
Arkansas 9 16 15 31 33
Mississippi 20 27 29 17 13
Virginia 22 19 28 24 18
Texas 41 33 22 9 6
Massachusetts 18 10 12 44 43
South Dakota 14 34 33 26 24
Georgia 29 24 20 18 28
West Virginia 11 20 23 32 31
Indiana 23 37 18 12 20
Illinois 26 32 25 19 27
South Carolina 31 28 31 30 25
North Carolina 27 23 24 34 29
California 25 13 19 36 42
North Dakota 33 35 34 20 23
New Jersey 43 31 17 29 30
Wyoming 28 29 38 23 11
Ohio 35 36 37 25 19
Idaho 36 39 35 27 32
Michigan 24 38 44 37 36
Minnesota 32 40 43 35 34
Rhode Island 47 26 27 43 40
Oregon 30 41 45 41 39
Kansas 46 42 41 33 35
Montana 37 46 47 38 37
New York 40 25 40 48 48
Wisconsin 39 45 42 47 44
Maine 48 44 39 42 41
Vermont 45 43 36 46 45
Iowa 42 47 46 39 38
Nebraska 44 48 48 45 46
Table 8.9 Base model rankings for specific years: State tax policies have
changed some over time which is why their rankings are not always the
same.
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Growth Rank 2004 2000 1990 1980 1977
Alabama 1 4 3 1 1
New Mexico 3 3 1 12 12
Louisiana 5 5 12 9 3
California 4 1 4 11 27
Nevada 26 15 5 2 2
Arkansas 8 10 8 8 4
North Carolina 13 11 7 4 6
Kentucky 7 9 14 16 11
Delaware 2 2 2 33 32
Tennessee 14 14 11 6 10
Oklahoma 6 6 13 14 17
Washington 15 19 17 5 8
Utah 9 20 21 13 14
Maryland 16 8 19 25 22
West Virginia 10 13 9 23 23
Massachusetts 18 7 10 38 34
Virginia 21 16 18 17 16
Missouri 19 17 15 28 26
Connecticut 36 12 6 18 13
Arizona 23 22 26 22 18
Colorado 12 36 30 20 19
Mississippi 24 26 27 10 9
Georgia 25 24 22 26 20
Florida 35 27 28 7 5
South Carolina 30 30 20 15 15
Idaho 20 35 23 29 24
Pennsylvania 27 25 25 21 25
Ohio 22 32 31 27 30
Oregon 11 28 40 34 37
Minnesota 17 29 35 35 36
Rhode Island 38 23 16 40 39
Illinois 31 37 38 32 28
New Jersey 41 21 24 36 40
Indiana 29 42 36 31 33
Wisconsin 43 47 43 3 7
New York 37 18 29 46 47
North Dakota 34 40 37 24 29
New Hampshire 47 33 34 30 31
Texas 48 45 39 19 21
Maine 46 34 33 41 38
Vermont 44 31 32 43 46
Michigan 28 39 44 47 43
Kansas 42 38 41 42 42
South Dakota 39 48 42 37 41
Iowa 32 44 45 45 45
Montana 33 46 48 44 44
Wyoming 45 41 46 39 35
Nebraska 40 43 47 48 48
Table 8.10 Growth model rankings for specific years: This ranking is cal-
culated using the growth model presented in equation 8.2. The corre-
lation between the base model and growth model rankings is .73.
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CHAPTER 9. Policy Recommendation
This thesis can be used by state legislators to construct tax policies that provide more
funds for public services with less cost to productivity. Results from this thesis must, however,
be coupled with an equally rigorous attempt to quantify the value of each public service under
consideration. The primary result of this entire thesis is that state spending and government
size are negatively correlated with wage rates after controlling for a plethora of state character-
istics. This result makes a strong argument for reducing state level taxes on income, property,
capital gains, and corporate profits. The value of the public services financed by these four tax
levies are not generally useful enough to be worth their cost to the state’s economic health,
measured by productivity.1 Taxes on consumption do seem to be worth their initial costs, but
only just barely.
This chapter summarizes the results of this thesis and puts forth a method for constructing
an efficient tax policy in the context of the dynamic general equilibrium model constructed
in chapter 2. Much emphasis is placed on testing the effects of a tax policy using multiple
measures of economic health and social well-being. This thesis relied mostly on the metric
productivity, but using others measures in concert with productivity will help to give a fuller
picture of how each tax contributes to the cost of government.
1The cost of government at the state level consists of market distortions that create dead weight losses, loss
of business from tax competition, black markets, and additional administration.
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9.1 Summary of results
Theoretical model results
Many assumptions are required in order to solve a theoretical model such as the one devel-
oped in chapter 2.2 The elasticities estimated using the theoretical model are not going to be
as accurate as those made by the empirical model developed in chapter 6. The purpose of the
theoretical model is to give a causal argument for why taxes might negatively affect a variety
of measures for economic health and social well-being. The empirical model is better equipped
to quantify the negative effects of a state’s tax policy.
The dynamic general equilibrium model, constructed in chapter 2, is used to quantify and
compare the market distortions caused by taxes on income,3 wealth (property), consumption
(sales), and capital income (capital gains). The model economy takes the form of a single state
containing a representative household and firm. A dynamic general equilibrium framework is
used to solve for five endogenous variables including the wage rate, consumption, labor, rental
rate, and accumulated capital. This model imposes taxes exogenously. There is no government
in this model actively choosing a tax policy. Elasticities are calculated showing how a 10%
increase in each tax (say from 5% to 5.5%) affects productivity, gross domestic product (GDP),
and household welfare.
Taxes on capital income and wealth are always ranked as being more disruptive than
taxes on income or consumption. For instance, the elasticity of productivity using the set
of “Average” parameter values finds that a 10% increase in taxes on capital income (say
from 5% to 5.5% will cause productivity to fall by -1.65%. This estimate, summarized in
table 4.1 is greater than the estimated drop in productivity from the same increase in taxes
on consumption, a drop of only -0.55%. All other measures of economic health and social
well-being find taxes on capital gains to be more costly than taxes on wealth. Differences in
estimates from one metric to the next emphasize the importance of testing one’s definition
of economic health and social well-being. A ranking of which tax is most disruptive is not
2Public goods don’t exist, markets work efficiently, the household desires only to consume and have leisure
time, there is no income inequality because there is only one representative household...etc.
3Income taxes in the United States include short term capital gains in addition to wage income.
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sensitive to the values given to model parameters within the range being considered.
Empirical model results
A panel data analysis of the contiguous United States from 1977 - 2004 is used to test the
results of the theoretical model. An empirical model, called the base model, is constructed for
this purpose.
The base model regresses the total level of productivity on lagged tax rates and lagged
controls. Of the four tax levies, the property tax is estimated to have the greatest and most
significant negative impact on productivity. In contract, taxes on consumption are found to
have mild if any effects on productivity.
Two tests are conducted on the significance of the joint effect of taxes on productivity. The
first is an F-test to find the probability that all tax coefficients are zero. The second tests the
significance of the estimated effect of the average state’s tax policy as given in equation 8.3.
Both joint effects are significant at the 0.1% level according to the base model.
Rankings of state tax policies, as summarized in table 8.8, are estimated using the base
model. Rankings are constructed by multiplying each tax coefficient by the state’s tax rates.
Tax policies are ranked based on the cumulative effect of the state’s tax policy on productivity.
The usefulness of the ranking is tested by comparing it to rankings of states by productivity.
Over 10% of the variation in state productivity rankings can be explained by state tax policy
rankings.
The most productive tax policies rely on taxes levied on sales, excise and capital gains. The
top three most productive tax policies ranked using the base model are Nevada, Tennessee,
and Washington with productivity rankings of 11th, 40th, and 10th respectively. The least
productive tax policies are estimated to be those that rely heavily on taxes levied on property,
income and corporate profits. Nebraska, Iowa and Vermont have the lowest estimated tax
policy rankings with productivity rankings of 34th, 25th and 48th respectively.
There is a fairly strong and negative relationship between state government size and pro-
ductivity. Just over 42% of the variation in state productivity can be explained by government
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size. Tests on the joint effect of tax rates on productivity from the empirical models suggest
that the low productivity in a state is at least partially caused by the higher tax rates needed
to fund a larger state government.
9.2 A method for developing the most efficient tax policy
This section outlines a method for constructing the most efficient tax policy. This method
ensures that all tax levies in the tax policy are set to minimize cost for a justified level of
revenue.
The most efficient tax policy satisfies two necessary conditions: All tax levies must generate
the same amount of revenue per unit loss in economic health and social well-being. The last
marginal increase in taxes must produce enough revenue that, when spent on public goods,
completely offsets the cost of levying the additional taxes.
What this means is that an efficient tax policy maximizes revenue while minimizing costs
to economic health and social well-being. A tax policy strategy based solely on revenue or
cost will not be socially optimal except by pure coincidence. If a government focuses only on
minimizing cost than a tax may not be effective at generating revenue. For example, suppose
a tax T levied on product P causes consumers in the economy to avoid buying product P. In
this case the tax is useless. The only effect of tax T was to prevent anyone from purchasing
product P. Now consumers must settle for some product B, leaving the economy as a whole
worse off. In addition, the government has generated no additional revenue to pay for public
services, and the producers of product P are now out of a job.
A tax can still be inefficient, even if the cost of a tax is close to zero. Suppose that producers
of product P in the example above could easily switch to producing product B. The effects of
the tax T on economic growth would be negligible, making it appear to be the perfect tax levy;
except for the fact that no one buys product B, making tax T completely useless. A similar
example can be contrived for basing a tax policy strategy entirely on each tax levy’s ability to
generate revenue. A tax may be marginally better at generating revenue and at the same time
be much more harmful to economic health and social well-being.
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Defining efficiency
Efficiency is a metric used to precisely tax by accounting for both a tax’s costs and benefits.
The efficiency of a tax levy is defined here as the marginal rate at which the tax can collect
receipts over the marginal loss in economic health and social well-being associated with the
increase in taxes. Different definitions of economic health and social well-being will lead to
some difference in the estimated efficiency of a tax levy. Welfare is the most typical definition
used by economists and so it is used here.4 Tax efficiency is thus defined more precisely as
the marginal increase in tax receipts gained per unit loss in welfare.5 In the limit, efficiency is
defined as follows.
taxi efficiency = (−1)
(
∂G
∂τi
)
(
∂U
∂τi
) (9.1)
Government revenues, G, is the sum of all tax revenues.
G = (τw)wl + τpk + τsA (k)
θ (l)1−θ + τkrk
Household welfare, U , is a function of consumption and leisure.
U = βt (ct)
α (1− lt)
(1−α)
This measure of efficiency only makes intuitive sense when taxes positively affect govern-
ment revenue and negatively affect welfare. A tax efficiency of 5 means that the change in
government tax receipts is five times that of the util loss in household welfare, or more simply,
five monetary units per util.6
This measurement is useful only when taxes actually hurt welfare. This is always the case
4A thorough construction of an optimal tax policy will use a variety of measures to proxy for economic health
and social well-being in order to ensure against a bias in any one measure.
5The main idea behind the definition is that a tax’s usefulness (or efficiency) should take into account both
the tax levies benefits and costs.
6A different metric for measuring economic health, such as productivity, would use monetary units in the
denominator. A metric without an easily interpretable unit could be measured in log terms, such as an index
of multiple metrics.
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in this theoretical model and generally the case in reality.7 Taxes, by themselves, do nothing
more than disrupt markets. It is the spending of tax receipts on public goods that cause greater
welfare, not the levying of taxes.
Public goods are purposely not considered in this model. By not considering public goods,
the effects of taxes are limited to their disruption on otherwise efficient markets. By levying
taxes which have no other purpose but to distort markets, the effect on household welfare is
always negative. A separate analysis of each potential public service under consideration is
needed to properly estimate a tax’s efficiency.
Tax revenues are given back to the consumer in a lump sum G.
G = (τw)wl + τpk + τsA (k)
θ (l)1−θ + τkrk
The revenues obtained by each tax independent of all other tax levies are presented in
figure 9.1. This figure gives the Laffer curve associated with each tax levy. A government
cannot always increase tax rates and expect an increase in revenue. The intuition behind this
result is simple. While a small tax may bring some loss in labor participation and output,
the economy as a whole will still function allowing some positive level of government revenue.
However, at higher tax rates the increase in the tax rate is not enough to compensate for the
damage done to the economy from market distortions that create dead weight losses, loss of
business from tax competition, black markets, and additional administration.
All tax levies produce a Laffer curves that only produce positive revenue at tax rates
between 0% and 100% except taxes on wealth, represented. This is because the household still
makes capital income from wealth each period before taxes are levied. As the property tax
increases the equilibrium rental rate of return on capital increases as given by equation 2.7.
The household’s elasticity of intertemporal consumption substitution equals 1/(1 − α) so it is
not linear.8 The production function satisfies the Inada conditions so as the capital stock goes
7The exception is when a good or service has a negative externality that is not already accounted for in the
price.
8For any α > 0 it is an elastic case, with α = 1 being the linear or infinitely elastic case. The steady state
capital stock is decreasing in taxes on wealth.
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to zero it’s return approaches infinity. In short, as the tax rate on wealth approaches 100%,
the returns from capital income get really big, offsetting the cost of having all the household’s
wealth taxed away. This result, although possibly of interest to academics, has no application
to tax policy in the United States. The average property tax rate is is 1.55%. No property tax
rate in the United States comes anywhere close to 10%, let alone 100%.
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Figure 9.1 Supply side economists use Laffer curves to show how a decrease
in a tax rate can actually increase tax revenues. Results from
the dynamic general equilibrium model constructed in chapter
2 show this to be the case for all tax rates greater than 60%.
Taxes on wealth can be set at 100% and still leave the house-
hold with an incentive to save. This is true only because the
household can make some money by investing its wealth before
it is taken away each period. This model ignores costs related
to tax competition, black markets, and administration. If these
additional costs were included in the model, these Laffer curves
would dip down at even smaller tax rates.
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Diminishing tax efficiencies
A comparison of each tax levy’s efficiency is summarized in figure 9.2. The efficiency of
each tax is calculated by holding all other tax rates at zero and by using model parameter
values that reflect the economic environment of a state in the United States.
When interpreting figure 9.2, note that the efficiency of a tax is a function of all four tax
rates. Although not shown in figure 9.2, the initial efficiency of the consumption tax drops
from 4.25 to 3.57 once the wage income tax rate is increased to 10%. It isn’t until the wage
income tax rate reaches 40% that the efficiency of a tax on consumption becomes greater than
that of a tax on wage income. What is shown in figure 9.2 is how the efficiency of any one tax
diminishes with its own rate. For instance, the efficiency of the wage income tax drops from
10.61 to 1.72 when the wage income tax rate is raised from 0% to 40%. The values for tax
efficiency are calculated using 10% intervals in the tax rate instead of the limit.9
When all tax rates are zero, the tax on wage income has the greatest efficiency. The
efficiency of the wage income tax diminishes as the wage income tax rate increases. When the
wage income tax rate reaches 60%, it becomes inefficient at generating additional revenue. All
tax levies have points before 100% where they become completely inefficient. Taxes on wealth,
consumption, and capital income lose all efficiency at roughly 30%, 40%, and 60% respectively.
9The derivatives of G and U with respect to each of the four tax rates contain more than 1024 characters,
making it difficult to give precise calculations.
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Figure 9.2 The efficiency of a tax is higher at lower tax rates. This is
because Laffer curves are concave. The efficiency of each tax is
constructed by holding all other tax rates at zero and using the
“Average” set of model parameters.
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Current tax efficiencies
The first thing to note from the estimates presented in table 9.1 is that all current tax levies
are efficient at producing tax revenues. Tax efficiency is calculated by recording the effects of
a 10% increase in each tax above historical averages where a 10% increase on a tax rate of
5% is 5.5% not 15%. The income tax is found to be the most efficient followed by taxes on
consumption, capital income, and wealth.
Metric Tax Efficiency Tax Receipts Household Welfare
Parameter Set Low Avg High Low Avg High Low Avg High
Income* 4.04 2.58 1.61 2.80% 2.02% 1.02% -0.22% -0.25% -0.26%
Consumption 1.92 1.23 0.60 0.95% 0.67% 0.29% -0.11% -0.12% -0.13%
Capital Income 0.42 0.22 -0.16 1.19% 0.68% -0.43% -0.62% -0.69% -0.73%
Wealth 0.44 0.23 -0.16 0.54% 0.45% -0.51% -0.27% -0.44% -0.85%
Table 9.1 Current marginal tax effects on tax efficiency: These re-
sults are calculated by substituting theoretical model parameters
with average historical tax rates aggregating the federal, state,
and local level. Each tax rate is increased by 10% in order to
calculate its efficiency and elasticity where a 10% increase in a
tax rate of 5% is 5.5% not 15%. * Income in the United States
is composed of both wage income and short term capital gains.
To adjust for this fact, all tax effects on income are defined as a
weighted average of effects on capital income and wage income
such that income = 84.7% wage income + 15.3% capital income;
The weights come from a report by taxfoundation.org for the
year 2005.
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APPENDIX A. Additional Theoretical Model Simulations
A.1 Simulation of tax effects on endogenous variables
Simulations of the effects of taxes on model parameters are presented in figures A.1 through
A.4 and table A.1. These effects assume values for models parameters mimicking that of the
United States for the years 1977 - 2004. After consulting with other studies, model parameters
A, θ, α, β, and δ are given the values 1, .35, .5, .935, and .08. These estimates are calculated
using an average of the estimates cited in the literature discussed in the previous section.
The four simulations summarized in figures A.1 through A.4 hold all tax rates at zero except
for the one tax rate of interest given on the x-axis. The value of all the model’s endogenous
variables including the wage, w, rental rate of capital, r, shadow price of consumption, λ,
labor, l, consumption, c, and capital, k, are shown as the tax rate of interest increases from
0% to 100%. Table A.1 summarizes the direction of each tax effect on the model’s endogenous
variables in addition to the second derivative of each endogenous variable with respect to each
tax rate.
Taxes always cause the household to work less and therefore consume less. The reason
for this is that taxes decrease the returns the household receives from working. Wages are
never increased by taxes. Every tax but the wage income tax decreases the wage rate paid
to the household by the firm.1 In addition to lowering the household’s returns for working,
taxes also decrease the purchasing power of the household. Taxes always increase the price of
consumption. With higher prices and lower wages the household works less.
Taxes differ in the magnitude of their marginal effects on endogenous variables at different
1The wage rate is not affected by taxes on wages only because of the functional form of the production
function.
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tax rates. The wage income tax, τw, is noticeably easier on the economy in multiple ways. For
one, the wage income tax has the smallest marginal effect on capital at low tax rates. The wage
income tax, and the consumption tax, are independent of the cost of renting capital unlike
taxes on wealth and capital income. The wage income tax effect on labor and consumption is
concave, meaning that lower tax rates have smaller marginal effects than higher tax rates. For
these reasons the wage income tax is more benign at low rates.
The wealth tax, τp, is a tax on the household’s capital stock. This tax is roughly analogous
to property taxes often levied by state and county governments in the United States. The
wealth tax has the most detrimental marginal effects on the economy at low rates. By increasing
the wealth tax rate to only 10%, total state capital drops by 57%; compare this drop to a 6%
drop in capital caused by a similar increase in taxes on wage income. Wealth taxes also have
the highest marginal effects on the wage rate. The wage rate drops by 24% when the wealth
tax rate increases from 0% to 10%. The wage rate is unaffected by increases in the wage
income tax. Taxes on capital income and consumption cause a drop in wages by 5.5% and 15%
respectively from a similar increase in tax rates. Wealth taxes also have the strongest effect
on consumption. By increasing the wealth tax rate from 0% to 10%, household consumption
drops by 21%; compare this drop to a 6% drop in consumption caused by a similar increase
in taxes on wage income. From the same increase in initial rates, taxes on consumption and
capital income cause 10% and 5.5% drops in consumption respectively.
Taxes on wealth and capital income are fundamentally different from taxes on wage income
and consumption because the former are applied directly to capital. The incentive for the
household to work is not directly hurt by taxes on capital, but do cause the household to
lower their savings rate. Conversely, taxes on wage income and consumption are taxes on
the household’s purchasing power and directly lower the household’s incentive to work. This
difference between the effects of taxes on capital and taxes affecting purchasing power are
vividly apparent in figures A.1 through A.4. Although all taxes decrease labor, taxes on
capital (wealth and capital income) have almost no effect compared to taxes on wage income
and consumption.
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Tax effects on the model’s endogenous variables are useful in identifying how each tax levy
is unique. However, the overall effect of each tax can be more accurately measured using a
combinations of endogenous variables. In the next section, three proxies for economic health
and social well-being are constructed from the models endogenous variables to better compare
the four tax levies.
Figures A.1 through A.4 describe how each tax affects the model’s endogenous variables.
Taxes on the household’s wage decrease output and supply of labor proportionally. For this
reason, productivity (Y/l), remains constant. Wage income (w) is proportional to productivity.
Thus, taxes on wage income do not affect the wage rate. This result is a product of the Cobb-
Douglas production function. The tax on wealth is the most costly to the economy at the
margin at smaller tax rates. Labor is less affected by taxes on property because the household
is not punished directly for working. Taxes on consumption have a strong negative impact on
capital accumulation, the wage rate, and consumption compared to taxes on wages. However,
taxes on consumption are not as detrimental to the economy as taxes on property. Taxes on
capital income diminish capital accumulation, but otherwise have relatively mild effects on the
economy at smaller rates.
The shadow price is in terms of utility.2 Labor is measured as portion of the household’s
time. The rental rate of capital and the wage rate are measured as the price of capital/labor rel-
ative to the price of consumption. Consumption is measured as the total value of consumption
in the economy where the price of consumption equals one.
2How much will a unit of the good please the household at the margin given some level of consumption.
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Variable Rental Rate, r Wage, w Shadow Price, λ Labor, l
Derivative FOD SOD FOD SOD FOD SOD FOD SOD
Income Tax, τw 0 0 0 0 + + - -
Property Tax, τp + 0 - + + - - +
Sales Tax, τs 0 0 - + + + - -
Capital Gains, τk + + - - + + - +
Variable Consumption, c Capital, k capital/labor
Derivative FOD SOD FOD SOD FOD SOD
Income Tax, τw - - - - 0 0
Property Tax, τp - + - + - +
Sales Tax, τs - + - + - +
Capital Gains, τk - - - + - +
Table A.1 Summary of tax effects on endogenous variables: FOD
stands for first order derivative of the endogenous variable with
respect to the corresponding tax levy. SOD stands for second
order derivative.
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A.2 Simulation of tax effects on proxies for economic health and social
well-being
Three measures of well-being are calculated in chapter 3 from variables in this model
including gross domestic product (GDP), productivity, and household welfare. Figures A.5
through A.4 give a visual summary of how each measure of well-being changes when model
parameters A, θ, α, β, and δ are given the values 1, .35, .5, .935, and .08 respectively. All
tax rates are given values of zero except for the one tax rate of interest given on the x-axis.
Table A.2 summarizes the direction of each tax effect on the model’s measures for well-being
in addition to the second order derivative of the measure with respect to the corresponding
tax levy.
Without the existence of a public good, or inefficient markets, it should come as no surprise
that all taxes are bad for all three measures of economic health and social well-being. All tax
levies hurt household welfare by distorting otherwise efficient markets.
This analysis is not meant to argue that all taxes should be removed from an economy.
Like any good experiment, all variables except the one of interest are controlled for in this
model. Only the distortionary effects of taxes are of interest here. In order to isolate these
distortionary effects, the positive effects of government spending are removed from the model.
The goal of this exercise is to compare the magnitudes of tax effects on measures for economic
health and social well-being, and give a clearer picture of how “cheap” each of the four tax
rates is.
One strong result from the simulations summarized in figures A.5 through A.4, is that
taxes on wage income are initially cheaper than all other tax levies. An increase in the wage
income tax rate from 0% to 10% has no noticeable effect on any one of the three measures
of well-being. All other tax levies have significant negative effects on all three measures of
economic health and social well-being.
Taxes on wealth have greater marginal effects on productivity, GDP and household welfare
than any other tax levy. A tax on wealth is also unique in that its effects on all measures for
well-being are convex, meaning that the magnitude of its marginal effects are greatest at lower
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tax rates.
A tax on consumption has relatively small initial effects on GDP and household welfare, but
big noticeable effects on productivity. The consumption tax effect on consumption is concave
when the consumption tax rate is less than 80%.
Taxes on capital income are almost as harmless as taxes on wage income at tax rates of less
than 10%. However, because the relationships between the capital income tax and the three
measures for well-being are concave, the negative marginal effects from the capital income tax
increase as the tax rate increases.
The purpose of a tax is to produce tax receipts for public goods as cheaply as possible.
Up to this point, tax levies have only been compared in terms of their cost. However, a true
comparison of tax levies requires an estimation of the cost and benefit of a tax. For the best
comparison of taxes, the revenues gained from the tax levy must be weighed against the effects
of the tax on household welfare.
Figures A.5 through A.4 describe how each tax affects different measures of economic
health and social well-being. Taxes on the household’s wage decrease output and supply of
labor proportionally. For this reason, productivity (Y/l), remains constant. Wage income
(w) is proportional to productivity. Thus, taxes on wage income do not affect the wage rate.
Again, this result is not robust to alternative forms of the production function. Other welfare
measures are diminished by taxes on wages but only by small amounts. GDP is calculated by
adding output and tax receipts. All welfare measures are considerably reduced when taxes on
wealth are imposed. Taxes on consumption have adverse effects on the economy. Taxes on
consumption are, however, less adverse than taxes on wealth. Taxes on capital income have
relatively benign effects on all three measures of economic health and social well-being.
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Variable Productivity, w Welfare, U GDP, Y Tax Receipts, G
Derivative FOD SOD FOD SOD FOD SOD FOD SOD
Income Tax, τw 0 0 - - - - +,- -
Property Tax, τp - + - + - + +,- -
Sales Tax, τs - + - - - -,+ +,- -
Capital Gains, τk - - - - - - +,- -
Table A.2 Summary of tax effects on economic health and social
well-being: FOD stands for first order derivative of the en-
dogenous variable with respect to the corresponding tax levy.
SOD stands for second order derivative.
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APPENDIX B. The zero-tax-on-capital debate
A sizable portion of the literature on tax policy focuses on this debate. For this reason
a summary is included to show the contrast of how this work’s approach to the optimal tax
policy question is different from “golden bullet” approach taken in this example.
Chamley (1986) formalized the argument for a zero-tax-on-capital using a closed economy,
infinitely lived homogenous agents and exogenous growth rates. Chari (1999) extended Cham-
ley’s result, showing that it “holds when agents are heterogeneous rather than identical, the
economy’s growth rate is endogenous rather than exogenous, the economy is open rather than
closed, and agents live in overlapping generations rather than forever. (With this last assump-
tion, the result holds under stricter conditions than with the others)”.1 Judd (2002) argues
that Chamley’s results holds under imperfect competition as well since “the estimated gains
are larger and the range of Pareto-improving policies is greater.”
These studies by Chamley, Chari and Judd, taken together, provide a rigorous theoretical
argument for taxing consumption instead of capital income. Their findings are given empirical
credence by Altig (2001), who uses a dynamic life-cycle simulation model to compare the
welfare effects of different tax reform policies. Altig also concludes that income taxes are
too high and should be partially replaced with taxes on consumption. A recent empirical
study by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development titled “Taxes and
Economic Growth”, supports Chamley’s original claim still further. The study argues that
“corporate taxes are the most harmful for growth, followed by personal income taxes, and
then consumption taxes.”
Opponents of the zero-tax-on-capital view include Aiyagari (1995) and Uhlig (1995) among
1Taken directly from Chari’s (1999) abstract.
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others. Both scholars use finitely lived agent models, such as the over-lapping generations, to
show that the optimal tax on capital income can be positive in the long run. The fact that both
major opponents use a similar model that is fundamentally different from Chari, Chamley, and
Judd is not a mere coincidence. Only Chari (1999) uses a finite lived agent model to achieve
Chamley’s original result, and in this one exception, Chari recognizes that additional strict
assumptions are necessary to ensure that the optimal tax on capital is still zero.2
Supporters of each tax policy are, for the most part, segregated by the style of model.
Those who find any tax on capital to be a bad idea typically use general equilibrium (GE)
models (Chari 1999, Chamley 1986). Their models assume that government tax receipts are
paid back to consumers in a lump sum rebate and ignore income inequality. Judd argues that
Chamley’s result holds for inefficient markets but uses a persuasive argument rather then a
rigorous macroeconomic model.3 Proponents of the zero-tax-on-capital view use models that
assume away all the problems in a real economy that lead to government intervention such as
the value of public goods and externalities.
Opponents of Chamley’s conclusion, including Koskela (2002) and Aiyagari (1995) typically
use over-lapping generation (OLG) or Bewley-type models.4 This alternative approach to ana-
lyzing the tax effect on the economy carries with it a new set of assumptions. Both Koskela and
Aiyagari assume market inefficiency. Uhlig goes a step further and assumes that a household’s
willingness to work is unaffected by the income tax rate.5 These new assumptions lead to new
conclusions. One plausible role of government is to correct market inefficiencies. By assuming
markets are inefficient, the need for a larger government increases. Larger governments require
greater tax receipts and the need for higher tax rates. The benefits of taxing capital are en-
hanced by the need for additional government revenues to correct for market inefficiencies. By
assuming household’s willingness to work is unaffected by the tax rate the cost of taxes are
2Additional authors may have made this claim as well but we focused on more recent, published studies.
3Judd’s paper “Capital-Income Taxation with Imperfection Competition” is a short, five page paper, that
pulls conclusions from other papers to make his argument.
4Koskela uses a GE model but assumes markets are imperfectly competitive making markets inefficient. This
is a typical characteristic of the over-lapping generations model.
5Uhlig assumes that supply of labor is inelastic to changes in income taxes, or anything else for that matter.
This assumption is necessary in order to show that increasing the income tax rate increases growth. In this case
capital gains are considered part of the household’s income.
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diminished.
Between these two extremes are those who find mixed results6 and those who find taxes to
have no significant effect at all7. Fourteen years later, Chamley (2000) questions his original
thesis that capital income should not be taxed and finds that his previous conclusion “hinges
critically on the assumptions of a long horizon and perfect markets for the inter-temporal
allocation of resources”. In his reminiscent work he essentially reiterates the importance of
model assumptions in generating model conclusions.
6Zodrow (2006), “Should Capital Income Be Subject to Consumption-based Taxation?”
Helms (1985), “The effect of state and local taxes on economic growth: A time series-cross section approach”
7Bauer (2006), “State growth empirics: the long-run determinants of state income growth”
Wasylenko (1985), “Jobs and Taxes: The Effect of Business Climate on States’ Employment Growth Rates”
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